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COMMENT
HOLDING RIDESHARING COMPANIES
ACCOUNTABLE IN TEXAS
MARTHA ALEJANDRA SALAS*
“Our technological powers increase, but the side effects and potential hazards
also escalate.”1
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Request. Ride. Pay.” According to ridesharing companies, making
use of their services requires only these three simple steps.2 Simplicity is
likely the reason why many consumers have opted to use services offered

2. See
How
Uber
Works,
UBER,
https://www.uber.com/ride/how-uber-works/
[https://perma.cc/4QHS-HJYG] (detailing how Uber works via three steps); accord LYFT,
https://www.lyft.com [https://perma.cc/TP2G-X59F] (“Request a ride and you’ll be on your way in
minutes. Request. Ride. Repeat.”); Something or Somewhere, GETME, https://www.getme.com/
somewhere.html [https://perma.cc/Q6WA-L2SA] (“Just tap to request a ride and a driver will accept
your request. . . . At the end of your ride, you’ll get an in-App receipt as well as an emailed receipt.”);
cf. How Do I Schedule a Ride on Wingz?, WINGZ, https://help.wingz.me/hc/en-us/articles/205823345How-do-I-schedule-a-ride-on-Wingz- [https://perma.cc/L3PN-66RQ] (describing the process of
scheduling a ride in four steps).
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by companies, such as Uber, Lyft, GetMe, Rideshare, and Wingz, over
those offered by traditional taxi cabs. Upon taking advantage of the
services offered by ridesharing companies, however, consumers are finding
their rides costly and less secure.3
On September 8, 2013, a group of men were assaulted by an Uber
driver who pulled out a knife and stabbed one of them approximately six
times.4 On February 8, 2015, an Uber driver drove a young woman home
after a night out with friends and sexually assaulted her.5 In March of
2015, an Uber driver attempted to burglarize a home after dropping off
the homeowner at the airport.6 In the United Kingdom, a woman
reported that she was threatened by an Uber driver over the phone after
she canceled a ride on July 5, 2015.7 On August 9, 2015, another woman
was driven home by an Uber driver who proceeded to sexually assault
her.8 In 2016, after an Uber driver was pulled over while driving three
passengers, police officers “found a concealed knife, methamphetamine
and drug paraphernalia and several Xanax bars” on him.9 In 2017, a Lyft
driver was charged with “threaten[ing] two passengers with a metal pipe in

3. See, e.g., Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 779–80 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (alleging
two young women were sexually assaulted by two different Uber drivers).
4. See Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 227 (D.D.C. 2015) (recounting the
stabbing, which was to the man’s “chest and left arm”).
5. See Complaint & Jury Trial Demand at 17–18, Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d
774, 779–80 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 3:15-cv-04670) (reporting Doe 1 and her friends ordered an Uber
through their phone app on the early morning of February 8, 2015, and that after taking Doe 1’s
friends home, the driver drove to a destination fifteen minutes off route to sexually assault her).
6. Ryan Parker, Uber Driver Tried to Burgle Denver Home After Airport Drop-Off, Police Say, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015, 7:07 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-uber-breakinto-home-20150331-story.html [https://perma.cc/5PS6-KY26] (“An Uber driver in Colorado was
arrested Tuesday after he tried to break into the home of a passenger he had dropped off at an
airport, Denver police said.”).
7. Alan White, Uber Driver Left a Woman a Voicemail Threatening to Cut Her Neck, BUZZFEED
NEWS (July 8, 2015, 12:15 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/alanwhite/an-uber-driver-appearsto-have-left-a-voicemail-threatening?utm_term=.jfG70xAB1M#.ltx4AkaEWG [https://perma.cc/
6UDC-QRP3] (covering a threatening voicemail left by an Uber driver).
8. See Complaint & Jury Trial Demand, supra note 5, at 21–23 (stating Doe 2’s friends ordered
an Uber driver for a 5:00 p.m. pick-up on August 9, 2015, and that the during the ride, the driver
drove to a remote parking lot where he raped and threatened Doe 2).
9. Uber Driver Arrested in Costa Mesa with Drugs, Knife, Police Say, EYEWITNESS NEWS
(Aug. 15, 2016), http://abc7.com/news/uber-driver-arrested-in-costa-mesa-with-drugs-knife-policesay/1471061/ [http://perma.cc/GT5J-QDS6].
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Boston[,]”10 and another Lyft driver was accused of “pull[ing] a gun on a
pedicab driver and threaten[ing] to kill her” in Austin, Texas.11 There are
many more incidents similar to these.
With the rise and increasing popularity of ridesharing companies, also
commonly known as Transportation Network Companies (TNCs),12
passengers have begun filing lawsuits against TNCs in attempts to hold the
TNCs liable for their drivers’ tortious acts.13 TNCs, however, have been
proactive in denying liability for their drivers’ actions, alleging drivers are
independent contractors, not employees.14 More specifically, TNCs allege
that because their drivers are not employees over whom they have control,
10. Police Charge Lyft Driver for Assaulting 2 Passengers, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 27, 2017, 2:07 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/massachusetts/articles/2017-11-27/police-charge-lyftdriver-for-assaulting-2-passengers [https://perma.cc/G8BH-QYVW].
11. Elizabeth Findell, Pedicab Cyclist: Lyft Driver Pulled a Gun After Rainey Street Dustup, AUSTIN
AM. STATESMAN (June 24, 2017, 5:40 PM), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/local/pedi
cab-cyclist-lyft-driver-pulled-gun-after-rainey-street-dustup/nQ5O1k3wwu2f9qzgJjGLjP/ [https://
perma.cc/Z5WU-W8GJ].
12. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Autonomous and Automated and Connected Cars—Oh My! First
Generation Autonomous Cars in the Legal Ecosystem, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 619, 666 n.169 (2015)
(observing companies like Uber and Lyft are being “regulated as Transportation Network
Companies”). Likewise, other commentators assert that companies providing ridesharing services,
like Uber and Lyft, are referred to as transportation network providers. See, e.g., David K. Suska,
Regulatory Takings and Ridesharing: “Just Compensation” for Taxi Medallion Owners?, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 183, 188 (2016) (distinguishing Uber and Lyft as prominent transportation network
providers). There are also scholars that refer to companies like Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar as “ridesourcing” companies; these experts note that:
Despite referring to themselves as “ride-sharing” companies, Lyft and Uber have largely been in
the business of what transportation experts call “ride-sourcing,” because they essentially provide
the same service as taxis through their own platforms. “I’ve studied ride-sharing for a long
time, and the definition of ride-sharing is really carpooling . . . . And a carpool is an incidental
trip.” That is, it’s a trip that a driver was going to take regardless of whether anyone else was
with them in that car.
Katy Steinmetz, How Uber and Lyft Are Trying to Solve America’s Carpooling Problem, TIME (June 23,
2015), http://time.com/3923031/uber-lyft-carpooling/ [https://perma.cc/NPX7-7ZLM].
13. See Greater Hous. Transp. Co. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 670, 677 (S.D.
Tex. 2015) (“On April 1, 2015, one of Houston’s Uber drivers was arrested for allegedly sexually
assaulting a passenger. . . . The Uber driver had passed an Uber background check despite having a
criminal record.”); see also Evanston Ins. Co. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 15-03988 WHA,
2015 WL 8597239, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015) (depicting two car accidents where the Uber
drivers struck several pedestrians and killed two); Mazaheri v. Doe, No. CIV-14-225-M,
2014 WL 2155049, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 22, 2014) (recounting how the Uber driver got out of the
vehicle while the victim was exiting, walked over to the victim and his wife, and allegedly hit the
victim in the face).
14. Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 781 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
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the TNC is not liable—under any theory of liability—for torts committed
by their drivers while on the job.15 Alternatively, TNCs argue that even if
their drivers were employees, the TNC could not be held vicariously liable
for the intentional torts of their drivers because those actions are not
Under these
within the scope of the drivers’ employment.16
circumstances, the legal system is left with: (1) drivers who are unable to
pay injured parties out of pocket for their tortious acts;17 and (2) TNCs
who are making millions of dollars18 from the transactions between riders
and drivers, but who incur zero costs from incidents arising from these
transactions, and who have minimal responsibilities regarding the hiring
and control of their drivers.19 Unfortunately for injured parties, Texas law
favors the arguments advocated by TNCs.
TNCs’ current method of operation contradicts public policy. For
example, TNCs are currently being valued at millions and billions of
dollars.20 Freeing TNCs from any obligation relating to their drivers’
15. See id. (stating “Uber urge[d] the court to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims” based on respondeat
superior); see also Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 226 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting Uber
alleges that because its driver was an independent contractor the court should grant its motion to
dismiss a case where the plaintiff was stabbed by his Uber driver).
16. See, e.g., Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 781 (considering Uber’s argument that their driver’s sexual
assault “falls outside the scope of an employee’s duties”).
17. See, e.g., Brian Strong, Laws to Regulate Ride-Hailing Services Are . . . Racing to Keep Up, PA.
LAW., Mar. 2016, at 49, 50 (observing personal insurance will exclude coverage when the driver is
using their vehicle for commercial purposes).
18. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosures and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L.
REV. 583, 633 (2016) (“According to the slide deck, in the month of December 2013, Uber generated
$18 million in revenue in San Francisco alone.”).
19. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (alleging
Uber profits from the transportation services it provides through its drivers); see also Andrea Bolton,
Comment, Regulating Ride-Share Apps: A Study on Tailored Reregulation Regarding Transportation Network
Companies, Benefitting Both Consumers and Drivers, 46 CUMB. L. REV. 137, 175 (2016) (asserting Lyft’s
only source of income comes from the twenty percent of administrative fee it takes from its drivers’
gratuity); Jennifer Pinsof, Note, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee Misclassification in the Modern
Gig-Economy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 341, 360 (2016) (“Uber does not earn revenue
by selling its software products; it earns revenue by taking a cut of its drivers’ fares.”).
20. See Sarah Buhr, Lyft, Now Worth $5.5 Billion, Hops into the Autonomous Car Race with General
Motors, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 4, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/01/04/lyft-now-worth-5-5billion-plans-to-get-into-the-autonomous-car-race-with-general-motors/ [https://perma.cc/8Q5K4UZP] (“[Lyft] is now worth a whopping $5.5 billion . . . .”); see also Tracey Lien & Jennifer Van
Grove, It’s the End of the Road for Sidecar, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2015, 6:14 AM)
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-sidecar-quits-ridehailing-20151229-story.html
[https://perma.cc/LDB3-AS2B] (announcing Sidecar “raised $35 million in financing during its
lifetime”); Harrison Weber, Timeline: How Uber’s Valuation Went from $60M in 2011 to a Rumored $50B
This Month, VENTUREBEAT (May 10, 2015, 12:24 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2016/09/28/6-
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actions while allowing drivers with minimal resources to pick up the tab
via pricey insurance premiums defeats public policy that favors entities
paying for the cost of doing business and loss spreading.21
This Comment will argue that TNCs should be held accountable in some
way for the torts of their drivers. It will analyze Texas law to demonstrate
that it does not provide relief to all parties injured by TNC drivers. Thus,
this Comment will urge consumers to seek relief through the Texas
legislature by demanding comprehensive legislation that can better regulate
TNCs’ activities within the state and hold TNCs to a higher safety
standard. Part II will detail the history of TNCs and their rapid growth. It
will also enumerate the policy concerns arising from their development.
Part III will analyze the obstacles precluding Texas courts from holding
TNCs liable based on negligence, the theory of respondeat superior, and
the nondelegable duty doctrine. Part IV will report on the current state of
TNC regulation in Texas. In particular, it will discuss House Bill 100
(“H.B. 100”), the newest Texas statute regulating TNCs state-wide.
Moreover, it will explain how the regulation favors TNCs—despite
creating uniformity and preventing TNCs from choosing to operate only
in the cities they find convenient––making it easier for TNCs to operate in
Texas with minimal responsibility to the public at large. Finally, Part V
will propose two amendments to H.B. 100 that are necessary to hold
TNCs to a higher safety standard and to better regulate their operations.
II. HISTORY & DEVELOPMENT OF TNCS
A. The Growth of TNCs
Transportation Network Companies were first introduced in
California,22 the birthplace of two of the most popular TNCs today—
Uber and Lyft.23 Founders of both companies have cited a discontent
things-startups-need-to-know-about-venture-capitalists/ [https://perma.cc/GNY3-NJD9] (valuating
Uber at about $50 billion in 2015).
21. See, e.g., St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 540–41 (Tex. 2002) (noting the cost of
doing business is placed on the employer because they are better able to spread the loss and bear
costs).
22. See, e.g., Alexi Pfeffer-Gillett, Note, When “Disruption” Collides with Accountability: Holding
Ridesharing Companies Liable for Acts of Their Drivers, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 233, 237 (2016) (observing
California is the birthplace of many transportation network companies).
23. See Uber vs Lyft: Comparing the Rideshare Titans, RIDESHAREAPPS.COM (Nov. 3, 2017),
http://rideshareapps.com/uber-vs-lyft-comparison/ [https://perma.cc/BVC9-3GYP] (“Uber and
Lyft were both founded in San Francisco, California.”).
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with transportation services as the motivating force behind building their
Their business model aims to “connect
respective companies.24
passengers to a ride on demand,”25 and to soothe congestion in urban
areas.26
Soon after their introduction to the public, TNCs began to expand and
generate profits exponentially.27 In 2010, Uber began its first test run in
New York with only three drivers and a few customers; shortly thereafter
it launched in San Francisco, California.28 By 2011, Uber was valued at
$330 million.29 Only two years later, in 2013, it was operating in twentyfive cities30 with a value of approximately $3.4 billion dollars.31 During
the same year, two other major TNCs, Lyft and Sidecar, were operating in
fifteen and six cities, respectively; Lyft was worth $275 million at the

24. See Ryan Lawler, Lyft-Off: Zimride’s Long Road to Overnight Success, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 29,
2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/08/29/6000-words-about-a-pink-mustache/ [https://perma.
cc/7C3H-4PJX] (detailing the motivation of one of the co-founders of Lyft who developed the idea
of Lyft after finding it difficult to obtain proper transportation in Santa Barbara during his college
years); see also Our Story, UBER, https://www.uber.com/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/Q7ZJ-BP6H]
(“On a snowy Paris evening in 2008, Travis Kalanick and Garrett Camp had trouble hailing a cab. So
they came up with a simple idea—tap a button, get a ride.”).
25. Bolton, supra note 19, at 139.
26. See Gregory Ferenstein, Uber Shows New Carpooling Feature Reduces Traffic Congestion 50% in
Pilot Areas, VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 7, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2014/10/07/ubershows-new-carpooling-feature-reduces-traffic-congestion-50-in-pilot-areas/
[https://perma.cc/V3WR-MR3X] (“In select cities where Uber’s version, UberPool, is available,
Uber confirmed to VentureBeat that the service reduces traffic congestion by roughly 55 percent.”).
27. See, e.g., Daniel C. Vock, State Regulators Step in on Ridesharing Controversies, PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/
stateline/2013/10/10/state-regulators-step-in-on-ridesharing-controversies [https://perma.cc/7P4N
-DE2E] (reporting Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar have experienced a “rapid growth and growing
popularity”).
28. See Michael Arrington, Uber CEO “Super Pumped” About Being Replaced by Founder,
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 22, 2010), https://techcrunch.com/2010/12/22/uber-ceo-super-pumpedabout-being-replaced-by-founder/ [https://perma.cc/9RMP-5JFN] (“By January 2010 [Uber] did
[its] first test run in New York. [Uber] had 3 cars cruising the SOHO/Chelsea/Union Square areas
and had a few people using the system.”).
29. Alyson Shontell, The Vision for $3.4 Billion Uber Is Much More Than Just a Car Service,
and It Could Vastly Improve Our Lives, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 23, 2013, 5:16 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-uber-is-worth-34-billion-2013-8
[https://perma.cc/U92QPRLD].
30. See Juan Matute, The Growth and Growing Pains of Transportation Network Companies,
STREETSBLOG LA (Mar. 12, 2014), http://la.streetsblog.org/2014/03/12/the-growth-and-growingpains-of-transportation-network-companies/ [https://perma.cc/5W4D-5K2J] (describing Uber’s
operation in twenty-five cities in 2013).
31. Shontell, supra note 29.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 4, Art. 5

886

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:879

time.32 By March of 2014, Uber had expanded to thirty-six cities33 and, in
June of 2014, had a valuation of $17 billion.34 In 2015, it was rumored
that Uber was valued at $50 billion,35 with over 300,000 active drivers.36
Lyft had over 100,000 drivers operating in over 150 cities37 with a value of
$5.5 billion in 2016,38 while Sidecar, before shutting down in 2015, had
raised a total of $35 million.39
With the rapid expansion of TNCs, many states and the federal
government saw a need to identify and categorize these entities to better
regulate their activities.40 California was the first state to do so.41 The
general definition of a TNC among various states includes:
32. Matute, supra note 30.
33. Id.
34. Weber, supra note 20.
35. Id. A more recent valuation shows Uber was, at some point after 2015, worth roughly $69
billion dollars. Henry Grabar, It’s Official: Uber Is Worth 30 Percent Less Than It Was in 2015, SLATE
(Dec. 28, 2017, 6:06 PM), https://slate.com/business/2017/12/uber-value-drops-30-percent-since2015.html [https://perma.cc/RZQ8-FTMT]. According to a report by the Wall Street Journal, Uber’s
valuation has dropped to $48 billion since then. Harrison Weber, Uber’s Unreal $70 Billion Valuation
Really Was Unreal, GIZMODO (Dec. 28, 2017, 6:15 PM), https://gizmodo.com/uber-s-unreal-70billion-valuation-really-was-unreal-1821633772 [https://perma.cc/K68G-5VG8]. Some speculate
that the drop in Uber’s valuation can be credited to negative press due to its irresponsible and uncivil
behavior. See id. (“As for what’s causing the drop, maybe it’s because Uber, as of a year ago, was still
losing billions of dollars. Or maybe the company’s awful behavior has simply caught up to it this
year, resulting in new regulatory hurdles, swaths of legal battles, and, ultimately, a
smaller-but-still-gigantic valuation.”).
36. Biz Carson, Why There’s a Good Chance Your Uber Driver Is New, BUS. INSIDER
(Oct. 24, 2015, 11:34 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-doubles-its-drivers-in-2015-201510 [https://perma.cc/VH9Z-U9ZV]. The expansion of companies like Uber can also be measured
by the number of rides (its primary service) they provide. See Brian Soloman, Uber Just Completed Its
Two Billionth Ride, FORBES (July 18, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/
2016/07/18/uber-just-completed-its-two-billionth-ride/#7f475f0e5224 [https://perma.cc/EEB9H2HQ] (examining the growth of Uber by the company’s increase in overall rides). Uber, in New
York alone, was at 300,000 rides in 2013, a number which increased to 3.5 million by 2015. Casey
Leins, Who’s a Sharing Economy Worker, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Aug. 21, 2015, 1:49 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/08/21/uber-airbnb-etsy-who-are-the-sharin
g-economy-workers [https://perma.cc/WF7L-KKRE].
37. Heather Kelly, Lyft Battles Uber for Drivers with New Perks, CNN MONEY
(Oct. 8, 2015, 11:30 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/08/technology/lyft-gas-perks-uber/
[https://perma.cc/AM9Z-LDCL].
38. Buhr, supra note 20.
39. See Lien & Van Grove, supra note 20 (“The nearly 4-year-old San Francisco company,
which raised $35 million in financing during its lifetime, has left the door open for using any
remaining funds to jump-start an alternative business.”).
40. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5431 (West 2018) (creating a new category to regulate TNCs
in California); see also COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-10. 1-602 (West 2018) (illustrating TNCs and
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(1) the use of a digital network to connect drivers and riders,
(2) to set up a prearranged ride,
(3) which the driver provides using his personal vehicle.42
In Texas,43 congress defined a TNC as “a corporation, partnership, sole
proprietorship, or other entity that, for compensation, enables a passenger
to prearrange with a driver, exclusively through the entity’s digital network,
a digitally prearranged ride.”44 Because a new category was created by
enumerating services that are not included in the definition); L.A. STAT. ANN. § 45:201.4 (West 2017)
(defining TNCs).
41. See, e.g., Lisa Rayle et al., App-Based, On-Demand Ride Services: Comparing Taxi and Ridesourcing
Trips and User Characteristics in San Francisco 4 (Nov. 15, 2014) (unpublished working paper),
https://www.its.dot.gov/itspac/dec2014/ridesourcingwhitepaper_nov2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/
66NX-8YPZ] (observing the California Public Utility Code created a new category of carriers,
referred to as transportation network companies, in September of 2013). Forty-eight states and D.C.
have some type of state-wide TNC regulation as of August 2017. MAARIT MORAN ET AL., TEX.
A&M TRANSP. INST., POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES:
FINAL REPORT 3 (2017), https://static.tti.tamu.edu/tti.tamu.edu/documents/PRC-17-70-F.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5RKP-FZD8]. Of the forty-eight states regulating TNCs, forty-one define
companies as TNCs. Id. at 20 tbl.2.
42. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5431 (characterizing a TNC as an organization “operating in
California that provides prearranged transportation services for compensation using an onlineenabled application or platform to connect passengers with drivers using a personal vehicle”); L.A.
STAT. ANN. § 45:201.4. The Louisiana statute reads:
[TNC] means a person, whether natural or juridical, that uses a digital network to connect
transportation network company riders to transportation network company drivers who provide
prearranged rides, or . . . that provides a technology platform to a transportation network
company rider that enables the . . . rider to schedule a prearranged ride.
Id. In Colorado, the statute defining a transportation network company included services that are
excluded from the definition. See COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-10.1-602 (defining a TNC as a
“corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, or other entity . . . that uses a digital network to
connect riders to drivers for the purpose of providing transportation” one that “does not provide
taxi service, transportation service arranged through a transportation broker, ridesharing
arrangements . . . or any transportation service over fixed routes at regular intervals”).
43. A report by the Texas A&M University Transportation Institute found a total of ten
TNCs operating in Texas in 2017. MORAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 15 (including “Fare, Fasten, Get
Me, Liberty Mobility, Lyft, RideAustin, Tride, Uber, Via, and Wingz” in their report).
44. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2402.001(5) (West Supp. 2017). The Texas Insurance Code
defines a TNC as:
[A] corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, or other entity operating in this state that uses
a digital network to connect a transportation network company rider to a transportation
network company driver for a prearranged ride.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1954.001(4) (West Supp. 2017). The Texas Administration Code also
defines TNCs for purposes not related to their regulation. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 5.1(5) (2016)
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state legislatures, as opposed to characterizing TNCs as a taxi service,45 it
became clear that state governments were in agreement that TNCs are not
taxis, or any other form of transportation service already in existence.46
Rather, they were to be regarded as a brand new beast, taking the
transportation industry by surprise and creating legal troubles along the
way.
B. It Looks Like a Taxi, It Operates Like a Taxi, But It’s Not a Taxi
As mentioned above, TNCs are not considered taxis in most states,47
and, it is argued, they do not function in the same manner.48 Thus, TNCs

(“Transportation network company—An entity that uses a digital network service to connect people
to transportation services provided by a transportation network driver.”).
45. The Texas legislature specifically included the following language:
The term does not include an entity that provides:
(A) street-hail taxicab services;
(B) limousine or other car services arranged by a method other than through a digital network;
(C) shared expense carpool or vanpool arrangements; or
(D) a type of ride service for which:
(i)

the fee received by the driver does not exceed the driver’s costs of providing the ride;
or

(ii)

the driver receives a fee that exceeds the driver’s costs associated with providing the
ride but makes not more than three round-trips per day between the driver’s or
passenger’s place of employment and the driver’s or passenger’s home.

OCC.
46. There are people who argue that the rapid growth of TNCs is due in part by the fact that
TNCs are not being regulated as taxi services. Sam Frizell, A Historical Argument Against Uber: Taxi
Regulations Are There for a Reason, TIME (Nov. 19, 2014), http://time.com/3592035/uber-taxi-history/
[https://perma.cc/AS2H-2XGS].
47. See Greater Hous. Transp. Co. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 670, 677 (S.D. Tex.
2015) (distinguishing Uber from traditional ground transportation services because it does not
employ its drivers or own the vehicles that they drive); see also Nathan Rott, California’s New Rules
Could Change the Rideshare Game, NPR (Aug. 8, 2013, 3:15 AM), http://www.npr.
org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/08/08/209885782/californias-new-rules-could-change-therideshare-game [https://perma.cc/G5E2-XMRZ] (reporting that the California Public Utilities
Commission placed “all of the companies under a new legal label: Transportation Network
Companies, or TNCs—not taxis”). But see Uber’s Motion To Dismiss First Amended Complaint In
Intervention at 2, Municipality of Anchorage v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3AN-14-09530CI, 2015 WL
1968762 (Alaska Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 2015), 2014 WL 8771183 (stating the municipality filed a lawsuit
arguing that it has the power to regulate Uber as a taxi).
48. Contra Glyca Trans LLC v. City of N.Y., No. 8962/15, 2015 WL 5320868, at *3
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 8, 2015) (“The New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) also
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are not treated as such in courts.49 TNCs operate through a cell phone
application that permits users, whether drivers or riders, to connect with
each other to prearrange a ride.50 Generally, a transaction with a TNC
includes:
(1) a request from a rider for a prearranged ride through the TNC’s app;
(2) a ride offered by a ridesharing company driver; and
(3) a payment charged to the rider by the ridesharing company.51
During the third step, the TNC normally retains a percentage from the
driver’s commission52 or charges riders a fixed fee apart from the
commission paid to the driver.53 At the end of the week some TNCs—
Uber for example—pay each driver their netted income.54
Initially, aside from the guidelines imposed by the TNC for which they
work, Texas drivers were not regulated by city codes or state statutes.55

started a pilot program which allowed yellow medallion taxis to arrange passenger pickups by way of
smart phone applications.”).
49. See Alamea D. Bitran, Comment, The Uber Innovation That Lyfted Our Standards Out of Thin
Air(Bnb), Because Now, “There’s an App for That”, 8 ELON L. REV. 503, 526 (2016) (“[S]ome courts and
legislatures are beginning to recognize Uber is not a ‘taxi substitute.’”).
50. See Jeremy Horpedahl, Ideology Uber Alles? Economic Bloggers on Uber, Lyft and Other
Transportation Network Companies, 12 ECON. J. WATCH 360, 360 (2015) (noting TNCs operate through
a smartphone application).
51. See How to Give a Lyft Ride: How to Give a Ride, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/enus/articles/115013080028-How-to-give-a-Lyft-ride [https://perma.cc/TV34-KMKC] (providing the
steps required for a ride with a Lyft driver). There are other communications that ensue during the
transaction, for example riders may provide drivers a rating based on their service, some TNCs allow
you to choose your driver and type of car needed, and if you did not set a destination on the app, you
must tell your driver where you are going so that he may insert the information on their GPS. See,
e.g., Something or Somewhere, supra note 2 (illustrating how Get Me functions).
52. Uber operates by dictating “the fares charged in each jurisdiction . . . collect[ing] the
appropriate payment from each passenger, and . . . pass[ing] on to its drivers 75–80% of the fares
collected while keeping the remaining portion for itself.” Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp.
3d 222, 226 (D.D.C. 2015). Lyft takes a 20% commission from drivers who applied to be drivers
before January 2016, and a 25% commission from drivers who applied after January 2016. Lift’s Fees,
LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/115012927407 [https://perma.cc/YCX3-8KWD].
53. See Terms of Use, WINGZ (May 30, 2017), https://www.wingz.me/terms-of-use/
[https://perma.cc/EJT2-SP8P] (declaring Wingz charges its riders a fixed fee aside from the
commission paid to the driver for their service).
54. See Getting Paid, UBER, https://www.uber.com/en-SG/drive/singapore/resources/
getting-paid/ [https://perma.cc/Z6FR-9847] (“Your earnings will be sent to you via direct deposit
into your bank account every Thursday.”).
55. See, e.g., Drew Joseph, Lyft, Uber Plan to Stop Operating in San Antonio Even with Policy Changes,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Mar. 5, 2015, 10:31 PM), http://www.expressnews.com/
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Today, this remains partly true.56 Additionally, TNCs argue they exercise
“minimal control over how its transportation providers actually provide
transportation services to . . . customers.”57 In other words, TNC drivers
were largely given free reign over the method of transportation provided
to riders. Over the past few years, however, control over drivers became
more stringent as many Texas cities, and then finally the Texas legislature,
began to regulate TNCs.58 During the early years, when TNCs were
regulated by individual city ordinances, several cities enacted regulations
that were more rigid than others, causing some TNCs to halt operations in
the cities they believed imposed exceedingly limiting laws.59
In comparison, in certain cities “[t]axis are authorized to pick up
passengers only through street hails[,]” known as the “walk-up market.”60
news/local/article/City-Council-hears-pros-and-cons-about-rules-for-6116908.php [https://perma.
cc/5V4F-XWNR] (noting Uber operated in San Antonio unregulated for almost a year).
56. After the enactment of H.B. 100—which regulates TNCs statewide—city ordinances
regulating TNCs within Texas city limits became preempted. See, e.g., MORAN ET AL., supra note 41,
at 10 (“HB 100 nullified all local TNC regulations and established one set of statewide regulations
governing TNCs.”).
57. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
58. See, e.g., Sara Thornton, Comment, The Transportation Monopoly Game: Why Taxicabs Are
Losing and Why Texas Should Let Transportation Network Company Tokens Play, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV.
893, 905 (2015) (“Texas follows the most common approach to regulating vehicles-for-hire in the
United States: regulation through local municipal ordinances.”). See generally TEX. OCC. CODE ANN.
§ 2402.001(5) (West Supp. 2017) (enumerating restrictions and requirements on TNCs’ operation in
Texas). Since the enactment of H.B. 100, which made it easier for TNCs to operate by lowering city
standards, several TNCs returned to cities they had previously ceased operations in. See Alex
Samuels, Uber, Lyft Returning to Austin on Monday, TEX. TRIB. (May 25, 2017, 12:00 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/05/25/uber-lyft-returning-austin-monday/ [https://perma.cc/
D6PT-GLDE] (“Uber and Lyft will relaunch services in Austin on Monday, now that Texas
lawmakers have passed a bill overriding local regulations on ride-hailing companies.”).
59. See Dug Begley, Objecting to New Rules, Uber Pulls Out of Galveston, HOUS. CHRON.
(Feb. 4, 2016, 7:40 PM) http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/
Objecting-to-new-rules-Uber-pulls-out-of-6804545.php [https://perma.cc/QYJ4-UCXG] (annou
ncing Uber left Galveston when the city passed an ordinance regulating TNCs in virtually the same
way as taxi cab companies); see also City of Midland Releases Statement After Uber Discontinues Services, CBS
7 (Feb. 2, 2016, 2:54 PM), http://www.cbs7.com/content/news/Uber-Discontinues-Services-forMidland-County-367299811.html [https://perma.cc/3SW2-UB49] (“Uber Transportation Services
have announced they will no longer provide services to the residents of Midland County. The
company says it is because of the new vehicle-for-hire regulations passed by the Midland City
Council.”); Eliana Dockterman, Uber and Lyft Are Leaving Austin After Losing Background Check
Vote, TIME (May 8, 2016), http://time.com/4322348/uber-lyft-austin-background-check-vote/
[https://perma.cc/U8DL-XKA7] (reporting Uber and Lyft announced their departure from Austin
after the proposition, which would allow them to self-regulate, failed to pass).
60. Katrina M. Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of New York Taxi Medallions,
30 YALE J. ON REG. 125, 132 (2013). The Texas legislature explicitly excluded companies that
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In Texas, you can either call a cab and prearrange a ride or wait around for
one to pick you up, that is, if the location is one where taxis generally
congregate.61 In most cities, taxis are regulated by the municipality in
which they operate.62 The regulations imposed on taxis include: paying
various fees to operate; holding a chauffer’s license; passing physical,
mental, and drug tests; providing fingerprints; going through training;
obtaining liability insurance covering the taxi at all times––in some cities
with a $1 million minimum; meeting the age requirement; and acquiring
medallions to operate, among others.63
Due to the differences in the way TNCs and taxicab companies are
regulated, courts have refused to apply law applicable to taxis in cases
involving TNCs64—although, generally, they operate in a similar manner
and provide the same services.65 The creation of this new category has
produced a need to institutionalize recovery avenues for injured victims.66
It is also crucial, for the benefit of consumers, to push for more stringent
state-wide regulations, holding TNCs to a higher standard of operation.

provide “street-hail taxicab services” from the definition of a “TNC.” TEX. OCC. CODE ANN.
§ 2402.001(5).
61. See, e.g., Why Austin Cab, AUSTIN CAB CO. (Aug. 12, 2015, 11:26 AM),
http://www.austincab.com/id18.html [https://perma.cc/6FH6-U6PQ] (indicating they accept
“[a]dvance orders for service”).
62. See Horpedahl, supra note 50, at 362 (“In most U.S. cities today, taxicab markets are not
organized on the principles of free competition. Instead, suppliers operate as cartels, almost always
sanctioned by municipal authorities.”).
63. See, e.g., Katherine E. O’Connor, Comment, Along for the Ride: Regulating Transportation
Network Companies, 51 TULSA L. REV. 579, 582–83 (2016) (enumerating a list of regulations imposed
on taxi drivers in New York and San Francisco, California). Most importantly, the organizations
within the municipalities charged with overseeing the taxi industry within the city create regulations
limiting and controlling the method in which taxi drivers operate in order to make the services safer
for consumers. See generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation &
Reregulation: The Paradox of Market Failure, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 73, 76–86 (1996) (providing a history of
taxi regulation in various cities).
64. See Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 779 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (recognizing that
Uber operated as a TNC); see also Greater Hous. Transp. Co. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d
670, 676 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (“Uber is a self[-]described mobile-based transportation network company
(‘TNC’) based in San Francisco, California . . . .”).
65. See Steinmetz, supra note 12 (reporting Uber and Lyft are in the business of “‘ridesourcing,’ because they essentially provide the same services as taxis through their own platforms”).
66. See, e.g., Pfeffer-Gillett, supra note 22, at 235 (“Despite these recent incidents, there is still
scant, if any, case law addressing whether TNCs can be liable for tortious acts of their drivers.”).
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C. Defying Public Policy
One of the issues with TNCs, as previously mentioned, is their ability to
conduct business on an international level and produce millions of dollars
in revenue without incurring substantial costs related to their drivers’
actions or having to enforce effective safety mechanisms for their
drivers.67 Essentially, via their business model, TNCs are creating a
separate taxicab company in every one of their drivers. In doing so, TNCs
divert paying costs associated with doing business to drivers who are less
able to bear the expense when TNCs are largely and directly benefitting
from the services provided by drivers. This business model challenges the
public policy in favor of companies paying for the cost of doing business,
which, under theories of vicarious liability, includes losses incurred due to
the tortious acts of workers.68
To ensure that such public concerns are effectively addressed, TNCs
must be held to a higher safety standard. By doing so, TNCs will be more
likely to provide a safer environment for consumers engaging their
services, and from whom they largely benefit.69

67. Some would argue that:
These services are able to operate cheaply, at least in part, because the drivers (unlike taxicab
drivers) carry noncommercial licenses and use their personal vehicles rather than company cars.
In addition, passengers and drivers find each other using a phone application, cutting out the
need to employ full-time dispatchers.
Id. at 236 (footnotes omitted).
68. In St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, the Texas Supreme Court stated:
What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a
risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur
in the conduct of the employer’s enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required
cost of doing business. They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged in an
enterprise, which will on the basis of all past experience involve harm to others through the
torts of employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured
plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them,
through prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the
community at large.
St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 540–41 (Tex. 2002) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 500–01 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)).
69. Cf. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 500–01
(W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (arguing that employers that are strictly liable for the
actions of their employees have a greater incentive to ensure the enterprise is conducted in a safe
manner).
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III. LIMITED AVENUES FOR HOLDING TNCS LIABLE
Parties have sought and maneuvered arguments in favor of holding
TNCs liable for the tortious acts of their drivers. In Texas courts, most of
these arguments should be struck down. That is not to say that there are
no cases in which TNCs, based on the facts of the particular case, can be
held accountable for their own negligent behavior. The theories of liability
and factual context under which injured parties may be able to recover,
however, are not always applicable to TNCs or are limited. Moreover,
courts cannot forge a recovery avenue where there is none.70
A. Employees in Disguise? Let the Superior Make Answer71
The most popular path to recovery used against TNCs appears to be
respondeat superior.72 With this approach, however, comes the biggest
hurdle: defining TNCs’ drivers’ status, one of the most contentious issues
in lawsuits against TNCs today.73 Judges have noted that the line
separating employees and independent contractors is not a clear one.74
70. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415
(1989) (discussing the role of the judge as an agent whose role is to apply legislative acts without
“considerations that cannot be traced to an authoritative text”).
71. This phrase is the Latin translation of the common term “respondeat superior.” Respondeat
Superior, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
72. See Phillips v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16 Civ. 295 (DAB), 2017 WL 2782036, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2017) (“Uber argues that it cannot be liable for the torts of [its driver] under a
respondeat superior or partnership theory because [the driver] was never Uber’s employee or partner.”
(emphasis added)); see also Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 780 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(seeking relief under the theory of respondeat superior); Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d
222, 229 (D.D.C. 2015) (asserting a cause of action under respondeat superior).
73. See, e.g., Aarti Shahani, Uber Settles 2 Lawsuits over Whether Drivers Are Employees or
Contractors, NPR (Apr. 22, 2016, 5:10 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/04/22/475228363/ubersettles-2-lawsuits-over-whether-drivers-are-employees-or-contractors
[https://perma.cc/6THVNQ2A] (noting Uber will pay over $100,000,000 to settle lawsuits regarding the classification of its
drivers). In 2016, Uber was fighting similar lawsuits over driver classifications in Pennsylvania,
Florida, and Arizona. See Mike Isaac & Noam Scheiber, Uber Settles Cases with Concessions, but Drivers
Stay Freelancers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/technology/
uber-settles-cases-with-concessions-but-drivers-stay-freelancers.html [https://perma.cc/5ZJ3-TNA5]
(“Uber still faces litigation about driver status in other states, including similar lawsuits in Florida,
Arizona and Pennsylvania.”). It should also be noted that in August of 2016, a California district
court judge overturned a settlement agreement between Uber and California Uber drivers. See Mike
Isaac, Judge Overturns Uber’s Settlement with Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/technology/uber-settlement-california-drivers.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/9AH8-UHRK] (discussing Uber’s settlement with drivers).
74. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944) (“Few problems in the
law have given greater variety of application and conflict in results than the cases arising in the
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The Texas legislature, however, provided a straight-forward structure to
determine the status of TNC drivers when it enacted H.B. 100.75
Nevertheless, in order to fully understand this theory of recovery, as
applied to TNCs, and the implications it carries, one must explore the
independent contractor versus employee debate.
1.

The H.B. 100 Elements

As noted above, whether TNC drivers are considered employees or
independent contractors has been the subject of much debate.76 In Texas,
and seventeen other states,77 the legislature provided guidelines in an
attempt to illuminate a solution.78 Under section 2402.114 of the Texas
Occupational Code:
A driver who is authorized to log in to a transportation network company’s
digital network is considered an independent contractor for all purposes, and
not an employee of the company in any manner, if:
(1) the company does not:
(A) prescribe the specific hours during which the driver is required
to be logged in to the company’s digital network;
(B) impose restrictions on the driver’s ability to use other
transportation network companies’ digital networks;
(C) limit the territory within which the driver may provide digitally
prearranged rides; or
(D) restrict the driver from engaging in another occupation or
business; and

borderland between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of
independent entrepreneurial dealing.”), overruled on other grounds by Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
75. See Act of May 29, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., H.B. 100, § 1 (codified at TEX. OCC. CODE ANN.
§ 2402.114 (West Supp. 2017)) (setting forth factors to determine whether a driver is an independent
contractor or an employee).
76. See, e.g., Dug Begley, Houston-Area Drivers Sue Uber Over Employment Status, HOUS. CHRON.
(June 30, 2017, 8:11 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/transportation/article/Houston
-area-drivers-sue-Uber-over-employment-11259881.php
[https://perma.cc/DMV3-NNJA]
(discussing a class action against Uber over the classification of its drivers in Texas).
77. See MORAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 20 tbl.2 (reporting seventeen states require TNCs to
“[c]omply with some definition of employee or workers compensation criteria”).
78. See id. (noting the number of states defining companies as TNCs).
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(2) the company and the driver agree in writing that the driver is an
independent contractor.79

When working for a TNC, most of these elements are met, making
drivers independent contractors under the Texas statute, and thus allowing
TNCs to avoid liability via respondeat superior. This is because most
TNCs do not prescribe how many hours a driver must work,80 nor do
they restrict drivers from driving for other TNCs.81 Further, TNC drivers
are not limited geographically to one location within a city; rather, drivers
are allowed to work in whichever city they reside or even to move across
city lines.82 Most drivers have a full-time job and only utilize TNCs “to
supplement their income[.]”83 Thus, TNCs do not limit drivers’ ability to
“engag[e] in another occupation.”84 Finally, most TNCs require that
drivers agree that they are independent contractors when signing a
contract to drive for the TNC.85 Accordingly, under the new statute,
TNC drivers are classified as independent contractors “for all purposes”
because they meet the elements set out.86 Even if the statute is not
79. OCC. (emphasis added).
80. See Drive with Lyft, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/drive-with-lyft [https://perma.cc/535L9LR9] (advertising drivers choose when they work); see also Drive with Uber, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/drive/ [https://perma.cc/8T8B-JSJ3] (“You can drive with Uber anytime,
day or night, 365 days a year.”). Although, in 2018 Uber announced that drivers were required to
take “six hours rest for every 12 hours of driving time.” Faiz Siddiqui, Uber Mandates a Six-Hour Rest
Period for Frequent Drivers, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/drgridlock/wp/2018/02/12/uber-mandates-a-six-hour-rest-period-for-frequent-drivers/?utm_term=.e
b2137db58e4 [https://perma.cc/QG6E-54L9].
81. See, e.g., Mitch Wander, I Drive for Uber and Lyft, GREATER WASH. (Feb. 8, 2017),
https://ggwash.org/view/62300/i-drive-for-uber-and-lyft-and-i-have-nine-tips-for-making-yourride-go-more [https://perma.cc/92RE-W4AQ] (noting the author has driven for both Uber and
Lyft).
82. Although regulated state-wide, various TNCs, including Uber, have requirements based on
city ordinances. See, e.g., Cities, UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities/ [https://perma.cc/3VJ8YVY9] (dividing Uber’s operation by cities). But see House Comm. on Transp., Bill Analysis, Tex.
H.B. 100, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (“Under [H.B. 100], drivers could serve multiple cities[.]”).
83. See, e.g., Steve Lopez, After Driving for Uber, He’s Keeping His Day Job, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 19, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-0920-lopez-uber20150920-column.html [https://perma.cc/Q477-PXLL] (stating two-thirds of Uber drivers have a
full-time job).
84. OCC. § 2402.114(1)(D).
85. See, e.g., Getme Terms of Service (EULA), GET ME (Dec. 23, 2016),
https://www.getme.com/terms.html [https://perma.cc/95AC-N97A] (“By providing Services as a
Go-Getter on the getme Platform, you represent, warrant, and agree that: . . . you are an independent
contractor and not an employee of getme.”).
86. OCC. § 2402.114.
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determinative on the issue,87 not only does Texas law reinforce the
conclusion that drivers are simply independent contractors, there are also
no other courts setting precedent by holding TNCs accountable.
2. The Independent Contractor v. Employee Argument in Federal
Courts
Black’s Law Dictionary defines an employee as “[s]omeone who works in
the service of another person (the employer) under an express or implied
contract of hire, under which the employer has the right to control the
details of work performance.”88 In contrast, an independent contractor is
defined as:
Someone who is entrusted to undertake a specific project but who is left free
to do the assigned work and to choose the method for accomplishing it. It
does not matter whether the work is done for pay or gratuitously. Unlike an
employee, an independent contractor who commits a wrong while carrying
out the work usu[ally] does not create liability for the one who did the
hiring.89

If courts labeled TNC drivers “employees,” then TNCs could be held
vicariously liable for their torts.90 On the other hand, if drivers are labeled
independent contractors, TNCs could not be held vicariously liable for
their drivers’ tortious acts.91 Most TNCs include in their terms that
drivers are independent third-party transportation providers, thereby
rejecting liability for any acts committed by their drivers.92 For example,
87. It is unrealistic to believe that this statute will end the debate over whether TNC drivers
are independent contractors or employees given the turmoil and years of arguments made by
legislators, activists, and others concerned with workers’ rights in the gig economy. See, e.g., Caroline
O’Donovan, Uber’s Latest Concession to Drivers Could Spell Trouble for Gig Workers, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Jan. 26, 2018, 1:16 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/uber-wants-to-help-driversget-benefits-but-some-say-this?utm_term=.pidExkEq2#.aip28Q2E7
[https://perma.cc/2DHYRLVR] (reporting lawyers and labor activists have, for years, battled over the classification of drivers
as independent contractors).
88. Employee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
89. Independent Contractor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
90. See, e.g., F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Tex. 2007)
(upholding the common law that a superior is vicariously liable for the torts committed by his
employees).
91. See Woodard v. Sw. States, Inc., 384 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1964) (explaining the rule that
an employer cannot be held liable for the tortious acts of its independent contractors).
92. See Lyft Terms of Service, LYFT (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.lyft.com/terms
[https://perma.cc/V95G-YXP9] (imposing an independent contractor relationship with its drivers
by stating the agreement between Lyft and drivers is “solely that of independent contracting
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the TNC “Get Me” was very explicit and required drivers to agree that
they “are an independent contractor and not an employee of getme.”93
In 2016, Uber pushed to settle lawsuits brought by its employees for
misclassification in two states: California and Massachusetts.94 Any
settlement, however, only signifies that drivers agree to be classified as
independent contractors, not that the courts in those states have
definitively ruled that TNC drivers, specifically Uber drivers, are indeed
independent contractors in the eyes of the law.95
In Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.,96 the Northern District of California denied Lyft’s
motion for summary judgment on Lyft’s drivers’ claim for wages, holding
a question of fact remained “as to whether [Lyft] retained [the] right to
control drivers.”97 In noting that Lyft drivers do not meet the traditional
concept of independent contractors in California, the court observed that:
Lyft drivers use no special skill when they give rides. Their work is central,
not tangential, to Lyft’s business. Lyft might not control when the drivers
work, but it has a great deal of power over how they actually do their work,
including the power to fire them if they don’t meet Lyft’s specifications
about how to give rides. And some Lyft drivers no doubt treat their work as
a full-time job—their livelihood may depend solely or primarily on weekly
payments from Lyft, even while they lack any power to negotiate their rate
of pay. Indeed, this type of Lyft driver—the driver who gives ‘Lyfts’ 50
hours a week and relies on the income to feed his family—looks very much

parties”); see also Terms and Conditions, UBER (Jan. 2, 2016), https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/us/
[https://perma.cc/QP7F-66F7] (providing Uber’s technology platform allows users to connect with
“independent third party transportation providers”).
93. Getme Terms of Service (EULA), supra note 85.
94. See Shahani, supra note 73 (“Uber will pay up to $100 million to settle the suits, and drivers
will stay independent contractors, not employees, in California and Massachusetts, just as the ridebooking company had maintained.”). The settlement in California was later overturned by a federal
judge who believed the settlement, which was agreed to by both sides, was “not fair, adequate, and
reasonable[.]” Isaac, supra note 73.
95. See, e.g., Tracey Lien, Uber Will Pay Up to $100 Million to Settle Suits with Drivers Seeking
Employee Status, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016, 9:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/
technology/la-fi-tn-0422-uber-settlement-story.html
[https://perma.cc/K735-SHWC]
(acknowledging courts have yet to decide whether Uber drivers are independent contractors or
employees).
96. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
97. See id. at 1067, 1070 (holding the case must go to trial because “numerous factors for
deciding whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor point in decidedly different
directions, a reasonable jury could go either way”). This case has since been settled for $1 million.
Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
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like the kind of worker the California Legislature has always intended to
protect as an ‘employee.’98

Unlike California, there are no federal district courts in Texas that
thoroughly, or even slightly, examine the relationship between TNCs and
their drivers. The closest there is to a discussion on the issue is the Western
District’s determination that Uber contradicted itself in alleging that it has
no control over the conditions in which its drivers operate in an American
The court noted that Uber’s complaint
Disabilities Act claim.99
acknowledged that “anyone with a valid driver’s license, car insurance, a
clean record and a four-door vehicle can log onto the App and connect with
ride-seekers,” and that these requirements are an indication that Uber has
some control over its drivers’ conditions of operation.100 All in all, however,
there are no federal decisions classifying TNC drivers as employees or
independent contractors on which other federal courts can rely.101
3.

Respondeat Superior in Texas

In Texas, “the doctrine of vicarious liability, or respondeat superior,
makes a principal liable for the conduct of his employee or agent.”102
98. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1069.
99. See Ramos v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. SA-14-CA-502-XR, 2015 WL 758087, at *11
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2015) (noting Uber has some control over the conditions of operation of its
drivers based on the requirements imposed for people attempting to become Uber drivers).
100. Id. The court also argued that Uber controls the application that its drivers use, in effect
controlling its drivers’ avenue for contracting with riders. See id. at *11 n.7 (“Uber also makes the
perplexing statement that it ‘controls no aspect of drivers’ means or methods of connecting with
riders. However, Uber controls the app that is the means/method of connecting drivers with riders.”
(citation omitted)).
101. See, e.g., Robert Mclean, Uber Will Pay Up to $100 Million to Settle Labor Suits, CNN
(Apr. 22, 2016, 2:34 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/22/technology/uber-drivers-laborsettlement/ [https://perma.cc/FTG6-Y5SL] (indicating no court has yet decided on the employment
status of Uber drivers). There have been many suits filed since 2016; however, many of the decisions
made on the status of TNC drivers have been made by state judges. See McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ.
Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (“Due in large part to the transformative
nature of the [I]nternet and smartphones, Uber drivers like McGillis decide whether, when, where,
with whom, and how to provide rides using Uber’s computer programs. This level of free agency is
incompatible with the control to which a traditional employee is subject.”); see also Dan Rivoli, N.Y.
Judge Grants Uber Drivers Employee Status, DAILY NEWS N.Y. (June 13, 2017, 8:05 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/n-y-judge-grants-uber-drivers-employee-status-article-1.324
5310 [https://perma.cc/V6JZ-YEZ4] (“The June 9 ruling from a state Department of Labor
administrative law judge granted the coveted status to all ‘similarly situated’ drivers . . . .”).
102. F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Tex. 2007) (citing
Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1998)).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss4/5

20

Salas: Holding Ridesharing Companies Accountable in Texas

2018]

COMMENT

899

Liability rests on the basis that the employer has a right to control the
employee’s actions, which are assumed to advance the employer’s
objectives.103 Before determining whether a TNC driver acted within the
scope of employment—which is also an element of respondeat
superior104—it must first be determined whether the TNC driver is an
employee of the TNC.105
In Newspaper, Inc. v. Love,106 the Supreme Court of Texas announced
that, in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent
contractor, courts must apply the right of control test.107 The Court
further noted that, when there is a contract that expressly provides for an
independent contractor relationship that does not impose a “right to
control the details of the work” on the employer, outside evidence must be
presented to show that the contract vested a right to control on the
employer.108 The true test, however, continues to be the right of control
and, thus, “the exercise of control is evidentiary only.”109 Holding
otherwise, the court noted, would frustrate the purpose of contract rights
and any relationship arising therefrom.110 In Thompson v. Travelers Indemnity

103. See id. (“This liability is based on the principal’s control or right to control the agent’s
actions undertaken to further the principal’s objectives.” (citing Wingfoot v. Alvarado, 111 S.W.3d
134, 136 (Tex. 2003); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 69–70 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984))).
104. See generally id. (discussing the theory of respondeat superior).
105. See, e.g., Darensburg v. Tobey, 887 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Tex. App.––Dallas 1994, writ denied)
(reiterating that the first step in determining whether an employer is vicariously liable for their
worker’s action is to find whether the worker is an independent contractor or an employee).
106. Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1964).
107. See id. at 586 (“We believe, however, that the solution of the question presented in this
case is correctly reached by the application of the test of right of control, which, according to our
decisions and most of the modern cases, is used as the supreme test.” (quoting Standard. Ins.
Co. v. McKee, 205 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Tex. 1947))).
108. Id. at 592. The Court specifically states that:
When, however, the parties, as in this case, have entered into a definite contract that expressly
provides for an independent contract relationship and does not vest in the principal or the
employer the right to control the details of the work, evidence outside the contract must be
produced to show that despite the terms of the primary contract the true operating agreement
was one which vested the right of control in the alleged master.
Id.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. See id. (acknowledging “contract rights and relationships based thereon” would be ruined
if the court were to hold that the right of control test was controlling in cases where the master and
servant have signed a written contract).
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Co.,111 the Texas Supreme Court further explained that it must determine
the employer’s “right to control the progress, details, and methods of
operations of employee’s work.”112 “The employer must control not
merely the end sought to be accomplished, but also the means and details
of its accomplishment . . . .”113
a.

The Right of Control Test

Contracts between TNCs and their drivers explicitly state that TNC
drivers are independent contractors.114 Thus, we look to the factors
considered in Texas courts to determine TNC drivers’ status.115 Texas
courts assert that the employer’s right to control is specifically measured
by considering:
(1) the independent nature of the worker’s business;
(2) the worker’s obligation to furnish necessary tools, supplies, and
materials to perform the job;
(3) the worker’s right to control the progress of the work except
about final results;
(4) the time for which the worker is employed; and
(5) the method of payment, whether by unit of time or by the job.116
In Limestone Production Distribution, Inc. v. McNamara,117 the Texas
Supreme Court found that a limestone delivery driver was an independent
111. Thompson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 789 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. 1990).
112. Id. at 278 (citing Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 585–90 (Tex. 1964)).
113. Id. (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ray, 262 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex. Civ. App.––
Eastland 1953, writ ref’d)). The Supreme Court of Texas thoroughly defined an independent
contractor as:
[A] person who, in pursuit of an independent business, undertakes to do specific work for
another person, using his own means and methods without submitting himself to the control of such
other person with respect to the details of the work, and who represents the will of such other person
only as to the result of his work and not as to the means by which it is accomplished.
St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 538 (Tex. 2002).
114. See, e.g., Terms of Use, supra note 53 (“The User and Wingz are independent contractors,
and no agency, partnership, joint venture, employee-employer or franchisor-franchisee relationship is
intended or created by this Agreement.”).
115. See, e.g., Newspapers, Inc., 380 S.W.2d at 592 (acknowledging that “evidence outside the
contract must be produced to show that despite the terms of the primary contract” the agreement
between the parties is that which creates a right to control by the employer).
116. Limestone Prod. Distrib., Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. 2002) (citing
Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 346 S.W.2d 598, 603 (Tex. 1961); Farrell v. Greater Houston
Transp. Co., 908 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied)).
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contractor where the driver retained discretion over how to perform many
aspects of his job, even when the driver was directed to perform certain
tasks.118 Among the things the driver controlled were, the ability to
choose what route to take when delivering the loads, when to visit the
office, what hours to work, and what tools and equipment to use.119
Moreover, the driver did not receive “vacation, sick leave, or holidays.”120
The driver paid his own insurance, expenses incurred from the job, social
security, and federal income taxes, and he was paid only if he delivered a
load.121 The court specifically held:
When we apply the right-to-control test to the summary-judgment
evidence here, we hold that it conclusively shows that Mathis was an
independent contractor when the accident occurred. . . .
Although some of these factors may not, alone, be enough to
demonstrate a worker’s independent-contractor status, together they provide
conclusive summary-judgment evidence that Mathis was an independent
contractor and not Limestone’s employee when the accident occurred. In
other words, the summary-judgment evidence establishes that Limestone
merely controlled the end sought to be accomplished—determining where
and when to deliver the load—whereas Mathis controlled the means and
details of accomplishing the work.122

Similarly, most TNC drivers choose what routes to take,123 what hours
to work, and what riders to service.124 TNC drivers, for the most part,
117. Limestone Prod. Distrib., Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. 2002).
118. See id. at 312–13 (providing reasons for classifying the delivery driver as an independent
contractor).
119. Id. at 312.
120. Id. at 312–13.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Thompson v. Travelers Indem. Co. of R.I., 789 S.W.2d 277,
278–79 (Tex. 1990); Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 346 S.W.2d 598, 603 (Tex. 1961);
Farrell v. Greater Houston Trans. Co., 908 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ
denied); Darensburg v. Tobey, 887 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied); Eagle
Trucking Co. v. Tex. Bitulithic Co., 612 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Tex. 1981); U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Goodson, 568 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Ray, 262 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1953, writ ref’d)).
123. See, e.g., Lydia Emmanouilidou, Drivers, Passengers Say Uber App Doesn’t Always Yield Best
Routes, NPR (Sept. 21, 2014, 5:30 AM) http://www.npr.org/2014/09/18/349560787/
drivers-passengers-say-uber-app-doesnt-always-yield-best-routes [https://perma.cc/3F9W-QM2W]
(indicating Uber drivers can take alternative routes by choosing to use navigation apps other than the
navigation app proved by Uber). Even if Texas were to require TNC drivers to take the most direct
route via a statute (similar to ordinances enforced prior to the enactment of H.B. 100), the specific
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utilize their personal vehicles to provide rides125—they pay for all
expenses incurred from using their automobiles for commercial
purposes,126 they do not receive paid vacation, sick leave, or holidays, and
they report their own taxes.127 Based on the McNamara holding, it is
evident that the law in Texas weighs in favor of finding that TNC
drivers are independent contractors––not employees.128 Thus, courts
should conclude, based on precedent, that TNC drivers control the means
and details in accomplishing the work requested by riders using the TNC’s

TNC would still lack control over which route the driver could take. See GINGER GOODIN &
MAARIT MORAN, TEX. A&M TRANSP. INST., TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES 17 (2016),
https://static.tti.tamu.edu/tti.tamu.edu/documents/tti-prc-testimony-08302016.pdf [https://perma.
cc/98W2-DTT9] (indicating at least two cities required TNC drivers take the more direct route).
Moreover, Texas courts have found that although “the driver was instructed to use the most practical
and direct route, to observe traffic laws, to drive slowly in passing schools and churches, and was
paid on a mileage basis” they were still considered independent contractors. Pitchfork Land & Cattle
Co., 346 S.W.2d at 603 (citing Dave Lehr, Inc. v. Brown, 91 S.W.2d 693, 694 (Tex. 1936)).
124. See Drive with Lyft, supra note 80 (advertising the fact that drivers choose when they work);
accord Mary Beth Quirk, Uber Drivers Say That When They Turn Down Ride Requests, They Get
Timeouts, CONSUMERIST (July 28, 2016, 1:16 PM), https://consumerist.com/2016/07/28/uberdrivers-say-that-when-they-turn-down-ride-requests-they-get-timeouts/ [https://perma.cc/FZH52Z42] (reporting Uber drivers can deny ride requests). Some TNCs, Uber for example, limit the
number of riders a TNC driver may reject before they are disciplined for passing up requests. See,
e.g., Mary Beth Quirk, Uber Drivers Say That When They Turn Down Ride Requests, They Get Timeouts,
CONSUMERIST (July 28, 2016, 1:16 PM), https://consumerist.com/2016/07/28/uber-drivers-saythat-when-they-turn-down-ride-requests-they-get-timeouts/
[https://perma.cc/FZH5-2Z42]
(announcing Uber drivers are locked out of the system for up to fifteen minutes if they reject too
many rides). This regulation, however, is minimal as it allows drivers to continue using their service
after only fifteen minutes, and it does not provide TNCs control over the way drivers perform their
job.
125. See generally Vehicle Requirements: San Antonio, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/sanantonio/vehicle-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/S8HU-Z68R] (listing vehicle requirements for San
Antonio drivers). There are some requirements TNCs must impose on drivers regarding the vehicles
they utilize to service riders; however, requirements are imposed pursuant to a Texas statute, and
thus, this aspect is not controlled by the TNC but by the state. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN.
§ 2402.111 (West Supp. 2017) (listing vehicle requirements for drivers of transportation network
companies).
126. Cf. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (alleging Lyft has
failed to reimburse drivers for expenses associated with driving for Lyft).
127. See, e.g., How Much Does Uber Pay?, LYFT UBER NEWSL., http://
lyftubernewsletter.com/how-much-does-uber-pay-in-2016/
[https://perma.cc/7YW3-K4VK]
(asserting Uber drivers, recognized as independent contractors, are responsible to report their own
taxes and do not receive certain “fringe benefits”).
128. See Limestone Prod. Distrib., Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. 2002) (holding
the driver was an independent contractor).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss4/5

24

Salas: Holding Ridesharing Companies Accountable in Texas

2018]

COMMENT

903

network platform.129
b.

Other Factors

The Texas Insurance Code explicitly states that, “A transportation
network company does not control, direct, or manage a personal vehicle or
a transportation network company driver who connects to the company’s
digital network except as agreed by written contract.”130 The drafters of
this provision seem to acknowledge that by imposing insurance
minimums not only on TNC drivers but also on the TNCs, they were
imposing a right to control a driver on the TNC. They chose to prohibit,
however, a determination that the insurance requirement created a TNC’s
right to control its drivers. Thus, unless the written contract between the
driver and the TNC states that the TNC has a right to control the
driver’s method of performance, the insurance regulation does not create an

129. In Industrial Indemnity Exchange v. Southard, the Supreme Court of Texas also held a
delivery driver was an independent contractor when the following factors were involved:
The trucks used in hauling the logs to the sawmill did not belong to the Lumber Company, and
the truck used by [the driver] was owned by him; and he paid for its upkeep and for the gasoline
and oil used in its operation. In some instances[,] the owners of the trucks did not personally
operate them, but employed drivers to do this work. The owners of the trucks were
compensated by the Lumber Company on a quantitative basis, [ ] that is, at so much per one
thousand feet of logs hauled. [The driver] was at liberty to haul or not to haul logs at any time.
He could determine the number of hours and the number of logs he would haul per day. It was
the policy of the Lumber Company, when it became necessary to reduce the number of trucks
engaged in hauling, to give preference to the trucks with the greatest seniority in point of
time. . . . The Lumber Company’s woods foreman, whose duty it was to keep the mill supplied
with logs, testified that if the truck drivers knew of any better roads than those laid out by the
Lumber Company in the forest, the truck drivers were at liberty to use them. . . . The woods
foreman of the Lumber Company gave out a letter to the truck drivers, advising against reckless
driving and urging the truck drivers to drive carefully and obey traffic regulations.
Indus. Indem. Exch. v. Southard, 160 S.W.2d 905, 906 (Tex. 1942). The court noted that, “Under
the undisputed facts, it is quite obvious that it was necessary for the Lumber Company to exercise
some supervision over the loading and unloading of the trucks, if the hauling of the logs was to be
done efficiently and expeditiously.” Id. at 907. Thus, it held:
The courts of this State have repeatedly held that an employer has the right to exercise such
control over an independent contractor as is necessary to secure the performance of the
contract according to its terms, in order to accomplish the results contemplated by the parties in
making the contract, without thereby creating such contractor an employee of such company.
Id.
130. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1954.102 (West Supp. 2017).
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employment relationship between the TNC and the driver.131
One of the stronger arguments in California for classifying drivers as
employees is that Uber has the right to terminate the driver at will.132 In
Texas, however, the Supreme Court has held that a business’s right to
terminate the at will worker is not indicative of their right to control the
details of the work.133 One could also argue that TNCs require drivers to
follow certain rules based on state regulations thus controlling the driver’s
performance. This argument, however, would also fail in Texas, where
courts have held that merely requiring “that a worker comply with
applicable laws, regulations and safety requirements that relate to
performance of the contract likewise do not constitute evidence that the
employer controls the details of how the worker performs his job.”134
In conclusion, under the right of control test adopted by Texas courts,
an analysis of the contractual relationship between TNCs and their drivers
characterizes the drivers as independent contractors, not employees.
Moreover, when the right to control test is applied to the relationship
between TNCs and drivers, the result labels TNC drivers as independent
contractors, barring any injured party from holding the TNC accountable
based on the theory of respondeat superior.
B. Accountability for Independent Contractors: The Nondelegable Duty Doctrine
Employers are generally not liable for the tortious acts of their independent

131. See generally Uber Needs Partners Like You, UBER, https://www.uber.com/
a/join?exp=70801c [https://perma.cc/YW25-HE3N] (“Drive with Uber and earn money as an
independent contractor.”). Other TNCs have similar provisions in their contracts with their drivers.
See Lyft Terms of Service, supra note 92 (“[T]his Agreement is solely that of independent contracting
parties.”).
132. See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (affirming the
right to terminate is compelling evidence that there is an employer/employee relationship).
133. See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Wolford, 526 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Tex. 1975) (“The testimony merely
reflects the view that if the supervisor from Tiffany Homes was dissatisfied with Wolford’s work
product, Wolford could be discharged. It is not, in our opinion, evidence that details of his work
were being controlled or were subject to Tiffany’s control.”); see also Bell v. VPSI, Inc., 205 S.W.3d
706, 714 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (“The right to terminate an agreement as to a
worker is not evidence that details of the work are subject to the principal’s control.” (citing Mary
Kay Inc. v. Woolf, 146 S.W.3d 813, 819 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied))).
134. Bell, 205 S.W.3d at 714 (citing Granger v. Tealstone Contractors, L.P.,
No. 05-04-00636-CV, 2005 WL 565098, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas March 11, 2005, pet. denied)
(mem. op.); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Compton, 899 S.W.2d 215, 221 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1994, writ denied)).
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contractors.135 Additionally, an employer is under no obligation to ensure
its independent contractor’s work is performed in a safe manner.136 In
Texas, however, employers are liable for the tortious acts of an
independent contractor if “the employer maintains detailed control over
the independent contractor’s acts or if the work itself involves a
nondelegable duty, whether inherently dangerous or statutorily
prescribed.”137 Under the Nondelegable Duty Doctrine, an employer is
“vicariously liable for the torts of an independent contractor involving the
breach of a nondelegable duty.”138 The duty may arise due to the
inherent danger in the activity involved or because it has been designated
by law or statute.139
1.

Duties Imposed by Law

“[W]hen a duty is imposed by law on the basis of concerns for public
safety, the party bearing the duty cannot escape it by delegating it to an
independent contractor.”140 Further, the duty imposed must be one
which requires the employer to “provide specified safeguards or
precautions for the safety of others.”141 Thus, to hold a TNC
accountable for the tortious acts of their drivers under this doctrine, a duty
must be imposed by law which requires the TNC to provide specific
protections or to take certain precautions for public safety.
In Texas, prior to the enactment of H.B. 100, city ordinances and the
Texas insurance statute required that TNCs: perform a background check
on potential drivers, that they meet the insurance requirement, establish a

135. Cf. Woodard v. Sw. States, Inc., 384 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1964) (indicating a
“contractee is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor” (citing Siratt v. City of River
Oaks, 305 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1957, writ ref’d))).
136. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Moritz, 257 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Tex. 2008) (upholding the
general rule that an employer need not ensure its independent contractors complete their work in a
safe manner).
137. Fifth Club, Inc. v. Ramirez, 196 S.W.3d 788, 795 (Tex. 2006) (citing Shell Oil
Co. v. Khan, 138 S.W.3d 288, 292 (Tex. 2004); Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778,
794 n.36 (Tex. 2001); MBank El Paso, N.A. v. Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. 1992)).
138. VINCENT R. JOHNSON, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 665 (5th ed. 2013).
139. See, e.g., Randall Noe Chrysler Dodge, LLP v. Oakley Tire Co., 308 S.W.3d 542, 546–47
(Tex. App.––Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (specifying a non-delegable duty arises if the work duty is
prescribed by law or due to the dangerousness of the work performed).
140. Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d at 153.
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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driver-training program,142 prohibit drug and alcohol use,143 and impose
age restrictions.144 Not one of these requirements, however, was
delegated by TNCs to drivers. Nevertheless, these regulations are no
longer in force.145 With H.B. 100, the Texas legislature introduced a
series of new regulations and adopted some regulations that were already
imposed by cities on TNCs.146 While the regulations in H.B. 100 impose
duties on TNCs, those duties are not the type that can be delegated to
drivers because failure to comply would prompt the state to revoke the
TNCs operating license.147
2.

Duties Arising from Inherent Danger

Texas has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 427,
which provides that:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special
danger to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be
inherent in or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has reason
to contemplate when making the contract, is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to such others by the contractor’s failure to take reasonable
precautions against such danger.148

Inherently dangerous activities arise from the “work” provided, not the
manner of performance; thus, liability cannot be delegated to the
independent contractor hired to do the job while failing to account for the
142. This requirement was limited to four cities: Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, and Austin.
GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 123, at 16–17 tbl.4.
143. See id. at 16 tbl.4 (noting Abilene, College Station, Dallas, Houston, San Marcos, San
Antonio, Austin, Galveston, and Midland have drug and alcohol provisions).
144. See id. at 17 tbl.4 (observing Houston, Corpus Christi, Galveston, and Midland impose
age restrictions).
145. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2402.003(a) (West Supp. 2017) (“[T]he regulation of
transportation network companies, drivers logged in to a digital network, and vehicles used to
provide digitally prearranged rides: (1) is an exclusive power and function of this state; and (2) may
not be regulated by a municipality or other local entity . . . .”).
146. Act of May 29, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., H.B. 100, § 1 (codified at TEX. OCC. CODE ANN.
§§ 2402.001–2402.201).
147. This result is due to Section 2402.201 of the Texas Occupation Code, which gives the
department the right to “suspend or revoke a permit issued to a [TNC] that violates a provision” of
Chapter 2402 regulating TNCs. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2402.201. Because Uber, Lyft, and other
ridesharing companies are still operating in Texas, the assumption is they have met the permit
requirements.
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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employer’s role.149 Courts in Texas have deemed few activities inherently
dangerous enough to warrant the imposition of a nondelegable duty.150
The courts have, however, refused to apply the standard to various
instances, such as “delivering groceries to a refrigerated box at [a] shore
base facility,”151 transporting utility poles,152 and patrolling an apartment
complex.153 The activity that TNCs and drivers are engaged in is that of
transporting persons from point A to point B. Given Texas courts’ track
record in refusing to find an inherently dangerous risk in other activities
involving the transportation of items,154 it is highly unlikely that they will
find such a risk in providing transportation services to persons.
C. Negligent Hiring
The most promising avenue for recovery is negligent hiring, which is
applicable even when a nondelegable duty is not involved.155 This
method of accountability, however, is limited. Injured victims may bring a
claim alleging negligence in hiring when the TNC driver commits an act,
whether intentional or negligent, that the TNC should have foreseen.156
The injured party must establish the employer’s failure to thoroughly
investigate, screen, or supervise the TNC driver and prove that the failure

149. See Fifth Club, Inc. v. Ramirez, 196 S.W.3d 788, 795 (Tex. 2006) (noting “the
responsibility for creating the danger cannot be shifted completely to the contractor performing the
work, while ignoring the employer” where an activity is inherently dangerous (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 427, 427A (AM. LAW INST. 1965))).
150. See 1 TEXAS PRACTICE GUIDE: PERSONAL INJURY § 4:99 (2d ed. 2017) (“Texas courts
have found very few activities so inherently dangerous as to impose a nondelegable duty.”).
151. Hanna v. Vastar Res., Inc., 84 S.W.3d 372, 378 (Tex. App.––Beaumont 2002, no pet.).
152. See Victoria Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Williams, 100 S.W.3d 323, 331 (Tex. App.––San
Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (declining the argument that the transportation of utility poles posed an
inherently dangerous risk).
153. See Ross v. Tex. One P’ship, 796 S.W.2d 206, 214 (Tex. App.––Dallas 1990) (noting the
work performed by a security guard “of caring for and protecting the property was not inherently
dangerous” (citing Gessell v. Traweek, 628 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1982, writ ref’d
n.r.e.), writ denied, 806 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam))).
154. Hanna, 84 S.W.3d at 378; see also Williams, 100 S.W.3d at 331.
155. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 138, at 672 (recognizing the doctrine of negligent hiring
may apply when a non-delegable duty is not involved).
156. See, e.g., 1 TEXAS PRACTICE GUIDE: PERSONAL INJURY § 4:117 (2d ed. 2017) (“Under
the tort of negligent hiring, an employer who negligently hires an incompetent or unfit individual may
be directly liable to a third party whose injury was proximately caused by the employee’s negligent or
intentional act.”).
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to screen was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained.157 For
example, an assault victim would have to prove that had the TNC
thoroughly investigated the driver, the TNC would have found something
in the driver’s background to prevent a reasonable employer from hiring
the driver, or to foresee creating a risk to the public by hiring the
driver.158 Proving that a TNC was negligent in vetting a driver is
particularly difficult.159
There is, at least, one pending case before a federal court in California
that contains the facts necessary to hold a TNC liable for negligent
hiring.160 As previously mentioned, however, this avenue of recovery is
157. See Fifth Club, Inc. v. Ramirez, 196 S.W.3d 788, 796 (Tex. 2006) (alterations in original)
(“Negligence in hiring requires that the employer’s ‘failure to investigate, screen, or supervise its
[hirees] proximately caused the injuries the plaintiffs allege.’” (quoting Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater
Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995))). In Houser v. Smith, the court reiterated that:
The basis of responsibility under the doctrine of negligent hiring is the master’s negligence in
hiring or retaining in his employ an incompetent servant whom the master knows or by the
exercise of reasonable care should have known was incompetent or unfit and thereby creating
an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
Houser v. Smith, 968 S.W.2d 542, 546 (Tex. 1998) (quoting Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d
173, 178 (Tex. Civ. App.––Tyler 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
158. See TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 240 (Tex. 2010) (alterations in original)
(“[A] plaintiff must show that anything found in a background check ‘would cause a reasonable
employer to not hire’ the employee, or would be sufficient to put the employer ‘on notice that hiring
[the employee] would create a risk of harm to the public.’” (quoting Fifth Club, 196 S.W.3d at 796–
97)).
159. See, e.g., Mazaheri v. Doe, No. CIV-14-225-M, 2014 WL 2155049, at *3 (W.D. Okla.
May 22, 2014) (“Although plaintiff asserts that because of plaintiff’s ‘simple application and hiring
process, it is unlikely that [defendant] would be able to determine whether John Doe posed any level
of risk towards [defendant] customers[,]’ that defendant failed to train its employees concerning
physical violence, and other conclusive allegations, the Court finds that these statements are merely
speculative and conclusive statements. Accordingly, because plaintiff’s conclusive and speculative
allegations lack the required factual enhancement to sufficiently allege that defendant had prior
knowledge that John Doe had propensity to commit assault, the Court finds that plaintiff’s cause of
action against defendant for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention should be dismissed.”
(alterations in original) (citation omitted)).
160. See Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 788 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding Doe
“sufficiently alleged that Uber should have” been on notice regarding its driver’s criminal history as
to be held liable for negligent hiring). Contra Mazaheri, 2014 WL 2155049, at *3 (“Having carefully
reviewed plaintiff’s petition, the Court finds plaintiff has not set forth sufficient factual allegations to
state a claim for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention . . . . [P]laintiff has not set forth any
factual allegations regarding any prior knowledge by defendant of [driver]’s propensity to engage in
assault.”). There are two more reported incidents in which the victims have initiated lawsuits against
Uber after being assaulted by an Uber driver. See Johana Bhuiyan, Uber Is Being Sued by Two Separate
Women Claiming Sexual Assault by Its Drivers, RECODE (June 30, 2017, 4:18 PM),
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limited to situations in which the driver’s background check would have
raised a red flag.161 Thus, riders who are unlucky enough to suffer an
injury at the hands of a driver who has a clean record would find it
difficult to recover under a negligent hiring theory. Similarly, TNCs would
not be accountable for the actions of a driver who has a history of acting
violently more than seven years prior to the TNC running a background
check because TNCs are only statutorily required to go back seven
years.162
D. Inadequate Accountability
There are recovery avenues for both the negligent and intentional acts
of drivers; however, they are limited to occasions where something in the
driver’s background would show that they are a risk to public safety.
Moreover, the background checks conducted by TNCs go back only a
certain amount of years—in Texas they are only required to search within
the last seven years.163 Thus, TNCs bear little to no responsibility for the
actions of the persons they hire as drivers, and who perform services from
which the TNC benefits. Additionally, the only recovery avenue available
holds TNCs accountable for their own negligence but not for that of their
drivers. This leaves courts with no grounds on which to hold TNCs liable
under Texas law for the tortious acts of their drivers.

https://www.recode.net/2017/6/30/15904770/uber-lawsuit-sexual-assault-negligence-backgroundchecks [https://perma.cc/7H7G-PB9E] (reporting a woman in California and a woman in Missouri
are suing Uber under a negligent hiring theory).
161. It is argued, and the author agrees, that Uber’s current vetting policy––which does not
require a fingerprint background check––is not sufficient to indicate whether a potential driver has a
propensity for violence. See Bhuiyan, supra note 160 (alleging, in two lawsuits against Uber, that
“more rigorous background checks, including fingerprinting, could have prevented incidents like
[two assaults on women] from happening”).
162. The new Texas statute only requires that TNCs inquire whether a driver “has been
convicted in the preceding seven-year period of . . . an act of violence[.]” TEX. OCC. CODE ANN.
§ 2402.107(b)(2) (West Supp. 2017).
163. See Adrienne LaFrance & Rose Eveleth, Are Taxis Safer than Uber?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 3,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/03/are-taxis-safer-than-uber/386207/
[https://perma.cc/L83A-344P] (“Uber background checks use a database that can only go back
seven years for some information.”).
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IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF TNC REGULATION IN TEXAS
A. State-Wide Insurance Requirements
In 2015, the Texas legislature took the first step in holding TNCs
accountable for the cost of doing business. House Bill 1733 was proposed
to regulate insurance requirements for TNCs and their drivers.164 This
Bill was enacted under the Texas Insurance Code.165 The statute requires
that “[a] transportation network company driver or transportation network
company on the driver’s behalf [] maintain primary automobile insurance
as required by this subchapter.”166 Moreover, it demands that the driver
be covered by that insurance while using his vehicle for commercial
purposes.167 The statute clarifies that the insurance requirement can be
met by either the TNC driver, the TNC, or a combination of the two.168
The statute divides the insurance requirement into two phases, the first is
between prearranged rides and the second is during prearranged rides.169
Finally, the statute provides that if the TNC driver’s insurance has lapsed
or if the coverage provided by the insurance policy is insufficient, the TNC
itself must provide the coverage.170
1.

Phase One: Between Prearranged Rides

Phase one takes place when the TNC driver is logged into the TNC’s
mobile application and waiting for a prearranged ride, but before actually
providing the prearranged ride.171 At this point, the TNC driver is
required to be covered by an insurance policy providing a minimum of
“$50,000 for bodily injury to or death for each person in an incident . . . [,]
$100,000 for bodily injury to or death of a person per incident . . . [, and]
$25,000 for damage to or destruction of property of others in an
164. Act of June 17, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 742, § 1, 2015 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2271 (codified
at TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1954 (West Supp. 2017)).
165. INS. § 1954.
166. Id. § 1954.051(a).
167. See id. § 1954.051(b) (requiring coverage for the TNC driver when “the driver is logged
on to the [TNC’s] digital network” or “the driver is engaged in a prearranged ride”).
168. Id. § 1954.051(d).
169. See id. § 1954.052 (setting forth the insurance requirements during phase one); see also id.
§ 1954.053 (explaining the insurance requirements during phase two).
170. See id. § 1954.054 (requiring TNCs to supply coverage if the “insurance policy maintained
by a transportation network company driver under this subchapter has lapsed or does not provide
the coverage required by this subchapter”).
171. Id. § 1954.052.
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incident.”172 This coverage, however, is insufficient for some injured
parties. For example, on December 31, 2013, a six-year-old girl, her
brother, and her mother were hit by an Uber driver who had logged into
the Uber app and was waiting for riders to request a ride.173 Only six
months after the accident, a report specified their medical bills were at
$185,000 and still rising.174 In Texas, courts have recognized the ability to
recover medical and funeral expenses in wrongful death claims.175
Moreover, courts have allowed the recovery of loss of companionship and
society and damages for mental anguish for the loss of a minor child.176
Seemingly, the minimum insurance requirement would be insufficient to
cover injuries sustained by all victims of negligent TNC drivers during
phase one. And, it is unlikely drivers have the ability to cover whatever
amount surpasses the insurance coverage.
2.

Phase Two: During Prearranged Rides

Phase two takes place when the driver is in the process of providing a
prearranged ride.177 At this point, the insurance policy must provide a

172. Id. §§ 1954.052(1)(A)–(C). The basic liability requirements in Texas are $30,000 for
bodily injury to or death for each person in the incident, $60,000 for bodily injury to or death of a
person per incident, and $25,000 for property damages. Melanie Torre, New Law Outlines Texas
AUSTIN
(Jan. 4,
2016),
Insurance
Requirements
for
Uber,
Lyft,
CBS
http://cbsaustin.com/news/local/new-law-outlines-texas-insurance-requirements-for-uber-lyft
[https://perma.cc/JQ2P-9KME] (reporting on the Texas insurance statute for TNCs).
173. Patrick Hoge, Dead Girl’s Family Steps into Legislator’s Insurance Fight over Uber, Lyft, S.F.
BUS. TIMES (June 25, 2014, 2:26 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/techflash/
2014/06/uber-lyft-insurance-sofia-liu-susan-bonilla.html
[https://perma.cc/D4RP-TPKC]
(reporting the mother saw an Uber driver “looking at a smartphone in his hand when he ran into her,
her daughter and son as they were in a crosswalk at Ellis and Polk Streets returning home from
visiting the children’s grandmother”).
174. Id.
175. See Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1992) (recognizing plaintiffs
may recover for medical expenses in a wrongful death action); see also Landers v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,
369 S.W.2d 33, 34–35 (Tex. 1963) (finding funeral expenses may be recovered in a wrongful death
action).
176. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. 1983) (“[A] plaintiff may
recover under the Wrongful Death Statute for loss of society and companionship and damages for
mental anguish for the death of his or her minor child.” (citing Downs. v. J.M. Huber Corp.,
580 F.2d 794, 797 (5th Cir. 1978); Taggert v. Taggert, 552 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex. 1977);
Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971))).
177. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1954.053 (West Supp. 2017) (describing phase two as “the
time a transportation network company driver is engaged in a prearranged ride”).
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minimum $1 million coverage for “death, bodily injury, and property
damage for each incident.”178
The state-wide insurance requirements imposed on TNCs and their
drivers provides more accountability for persons injured by the negligence
of TNC drivers. However, while the insurance statute allows for the
compensation of injured parties, TNCs remain largely excused for their
involvement in the industry. The TNC driver is still responsible for
maintaining personal liability insurance and collision coverage or
comprehensive insurance to be covered for physical damage under the
TNC’s insurance during phase two.179 During phase one, some TNCs,
for example, Uber, only provide the remaining coverage in instances where
the driver is not covered.180 Thus, while TNCs are taking some
responsibility for the cost of doing business, they are diverting most of
that cost to their drivers via insurance premiums.
B. Pre-2017: Municipal-Wide Regulations
Prior to the enactment of H.B. 100, ordinances regulated TNCs in
individual municipalities.181 Between the years of 2014 and 2016, twenty
cities had enacted ordinances regulating TNCs.182 These cities included:
Abilene, Amarillo, Austin, Beaumont, Bryan, College Station, Corpus
Christi, Dallas, El Paso, Fort Worth, Galveston, Houston, Longview,
Lubbock, Midland, New Braunfels, Odessa, San Antonio, San Marcos, and
Tyler.183 In at least five of those cities, some TNCs ceased operating
because of their unwillingness to respect regulations, in particular
regulations requiring fingerprint background checks.184
178. Id. § 1954.053(1).
179. See Insurance: How You’re Covered, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/insurance/
[https://perma.cc/X2LA-UCV3] (noting collision and comprehensive coverage is provided to
drivers if the driver has “such coverage on [their] personal insurance”); see also Torre, supra note 172
(“Industry experts recommend TNC drivers talk with their insurance agents to make sure they have
the right coverage because at the end of the day, they’re the ones behind the wheel and they’re the
ones responsible.”).
180. See Insurance: How You’re Covered, supra note 179 (announcing Uber maintains liability
insurance on its drivers’ behalf if the driver fails to maintain the required insurance).
181. See, e.g., MORAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 25 (mapping the cities that enacted TNC
ordinances).
182. See, e.g., id. at 24.
183. See id. at 25 (including Figure 4 to display the cities in Texas that had enacted local
ordinances regulating TNCs).
184. See id. (noting both Uber and Lyft left San Antonio, Austin, Corpus Christi, Galveston,
Houston, and Midland). A few months after Uber and Lyft left San Antonio, the city created a
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C. Post-2017: State-Wide Regulation
On February 6, 2017, H.B. 100 was introduced in the Texas House of
Representatives.185 After some debate,186 the Bill passed both the
House, on April 20, 2017, and the Senate, on May 17, 2017.187 The
Governor signed the Bill on May 29, 2017.188 And, because the Bill
passed the senate on a 21–9 vote, more than two-thirds support, the Bill
went “into effect immediately after the [G]overnor sign[ed] it.”189
The Bill is divided into five subchapters.190 The first subchapter
provides general provisions covering definitions, the nature of TNCs, drivers,
and vehicles, the controlling authority, and indicates that the provision
is applicable to drivers logged into the TNC’s network.191 The second
subchapter delineates permit requirements.192 The third subchapter
The fourth subchapter
regulates the operation of TNCs.193
covers records and other information.194 Finally, the fifth subchapter

temporary compromise agreement which led to the return of both TNCs to the city. See GOODIN &
MORAN, supra note 123, at 15 (“In October 2015, the City Council passed a temporary, compromise
agreement, and Uber and Lyft returned to San Antonio.”).
185. HB 100 Legislative History, Texas Legis. Online, http://www.legis.state.tx.us/
BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=85R&Bill=HB100 [https://perma.cc/CHA8-5BME]. The Bill
was authored by Representatives Chris Paddie, Senfronia Thompson, Poncho Nevárez, John
Kuempel, and Geanie W. Morrison. Id.
186. See Alex Samuels, Senate Sends Bill Creating Statewide Ride-Hailing Regulations to Governor,
TEX. TRIB. (May 17, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/05/17/senate-tentatively-backsmeasure-creating-statewide-regulations-ride-h/ [https://perma.cc/53GK-S2TW] (“After a debate
among lawmakers over the best way to regulate services like Uber and Lyft, the Texas Senate on
Wednesday backed a proposal that would override local regulations concerning ride-hailing
companies.”); see also Ben Wear, Texas House Gives Initial Approval to State Ride-Hailing Bill,
MYSTATESMAN (Apr. 19, 2017, 4:26 PM), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/transportation/
texas-house-gives-initial-approval-state-ride-hailing-bill/5vi1We6kKidi2TqGKkbNvJ/
[https://
perma.cc/8EYP-XWLZ] (opining H.B. 100 “easily passed the Texas House . . . after an exhaustive
five-hour debate”).
187. HB 100 Legislative History, supra note 185.
188. Id.
189. Samuels, supra note 186.
190. See Act of May 29, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., H.B. 100, § 1 (codified at TEX. OCC. CODE
ANN. § 2402 (West Supp. 2017) (dividing the bill into subchapters A through E).
191. Id. (codified at OCC. §§ 2402.001–.004).
192. Id. (codified at OCC. §§ 2402.051–.052).
193. Id. (codified at OCC. §§ 2402.101–.115). This subchapter governs insurance, fares, share
rides, receipts, identifications of drivers and vehicles, alcohol policy, driver requirements, types of
rides allowed, digital identification, vehicle requirements, nondiscrimination policy, accessibility
programs, drivers as independent contractors, and agreements with third parties. Id.
194. Id. (codified at OCC. §§ 2402.151–.154).
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outlines enforcement mechanisms.195
Texas’ latest state-wide regulation on TNCs has led to uniformity. Now
that TNCs are regulated in a similar fashion across the state, TNCs are less
likely to pick and choose which cities are the most convenient to operate
in––that is, which are less costly––as they did in previous years.196
Further, state-wide application will reduce compliance costs. For example,
TNCs will no longer have to pay a permit fee in each city in which they
decide to operate; rather, the TNC will pay an annual fee of $5,000 to the
Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation.197 This should, in effect,
reduce the cost of the service for consumers. Finally, by enacting a statute
regulating TNCs state-wide, Texas has made a move supported by many
and advocated for on the national level.198 Currently, Texas has joined
the ranks of forty-seven states and Washington, D.C., in enacting

195. Id. (codified at OCC. § 2402.201).
196. See Joe Martin, With Rideshare Bill Passed, Uber, Lyft Re-Enter Houston-Area Markets, HOUS.
BUS. J. (May 30, 2017, 12:11 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/news/2017/05/30/lyftto-relaunch-in-houston-this-week.html [https://perma.cc/A4EG-666T] (noting Lyft left Houston in
2014 and Uber left Galveston in 2016 after the cities passed regulations limiting the TNCs’
operations); Lauren Melear, Uber Returns to Midland, EMPOWER TEXANS (June 6, 2016),
https://empowertexans.com/around-texas/uber-returns-to-midland/
[https://perma.cc/X5SPVA5U] (reporting Uber ceased operating in Midland due to disagreements over city regulations). It
should be noted that although this statute deters TNCs from choosing which cities are more
convenient to operate in, it has also made it easier for TNCs to operate anywhere in Texas because it
lowered safety standards. See David Piperno, A Regulation That Would Be a Disaster for Austin and the
Rest of Texas, TRIBTALK (May 16, 2017), https://www.tribtalk.org/2017/05/16/a-regulation-thatwould-be-a-disaster-for-austin-and-the-rest-of-texas/ [https://perma.cc/XAW8-N5XN] (discussing
the negative effects of H.B. 100). See generally Dockterman, supra note 59 (announcing Uber and Lyft
will be leaving Austin after proposition 1, a pro-TNC ordinance, failed to pass).
197. See House Comm. on Transp., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 100, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (“A
TNC would be required to apply for and receive a permit before operating in the state. Permit
holders would have to meet the requirements of the bill and pay an annual fee of $5,000 to TDLR.”).
Drivers will also have the ability to move across city lines while working for a TNC, but need not
obtain a permit in each city they operate in. See id. (“Under [H.B. 100], drivers could serve multiple
cities without applying for a new driver permit in each one. TNCs and drivers currently need city
specific permits in many municipalities.”).
198. See, e.g., Jon Herskovitz, Texas Lawmakers Clear Way for Uber, Lyft Return to Major Cities,
REUTERS (May 21, 2017, 6:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-texas-ridesharing/
texas-lawmakers-clear-way-for-uber-lyft-return-to-major-cities-idUSKBN18H0IJ [https://perma.cc/
7ZEC-9STT] (quoting the statement by deputy assistant director of administration and regulatory
affairs for the city of Houston recognizing that there is a national push “from the industry to enact
regulations for [TNCs] at the state rather than city level”).
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legislation regulating the operation of TNCs state-wide.199 Nevertheless,
the statute lacks safety features, allowing TNCs to easily operate in more
Texas cities than before without the protections previously instituted for
the benefit of consumers.
V. THE NEED FOR BETTER SAFETY STANDARDS
VIA LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Rather than burden courts with the task of holding TNCs liable under
theories of liability that are not applicable to TNCs or that may take many
years to develop, consumers should turn to the Texas Legislature and
request that they provide better protections, not merely acceptable standards.
The new state-wide regulation should contain provisions geared toward
providing for the safety and protection of Texans. While there are various
features that should be added to the Texas statute, two in particular would
increase the safety of consumers: driver training programs and
fingerprint-based background checks.
A. Fingerprint-Based Background Checks
As noted above, two of the more popular TNCs, Lyft and Uber, left
various cities after city ordinances mandated they comply with more
rigorous background checks.200 More specifically, the city ordinances
required TNCs to conduct “fingerprint-based background checks,” which

199. See MORAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 8 (listing the types of regulations instituted in
forty-eight states and Washington, D.C., including Texas). Among the functions regulated by the
states are: operational standards, background check requirements, operating permits and fees, driver
and vehicle requirements, insurance requirements, passenger safety, and nondiscrimination
provisions. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.748(5) (West 2018) (mandating TNCs disclose driver and
vehicle information to passengers); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 690B.470 (West 2018) (detailing
insurance requirements for TNCs operating in Nevada); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-7-16 (2018)
(requiring nondiscrimination policies); 66 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2604.1(a), (b)
(West 2018) (listing licensure requirements for TNCs in Pennsylvania); VA. CODE. ANN.
§ 46.2-2099.49 (West 2018) (enumerating requirements for TNC drivers in Virginia, including a
mandatory background screening).
200. Alex Samuels & Todd Wiseman, We Asked Texans Who Should Regulate Uber and Lyft.
Here’s What They Said., TEX. TRIB. (June 26, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.
org/2017/06/26/how-uber-and-lyfts-return-texas-cities-are-affecting-drivers-and-custo/ [https://
perma.cc/NY9K-A8LR] (reporting Lyft left Houston in 2014 “after a mandate [] went into effect
requiring ride-hailing companies to perform fingerprint background checks on drivers,” and that
Uber and Lyft left Austin in 2016 “after the Austin City Council passed an ordinance requiring ridehailing companies to perform fingerprint background checks on drivers”).
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are typically conducted via a government agency.201 Such background
checks, cities argued, would procure public safety.202 A city of Houston
spokeswoman, Lara Cottingham, stated: “We are proud we have one of
the strongest, if not the strongest ordinance, in the country . . . . The city
of Houston wants to ensure that if you get into a cab, limo, Uber or Lyft,
the city knows that the driver is safe and the vehicle is safe.”203 TNCs,
however, urged for, and succeeded in obtaining, a less rigorous standard,
the name and Social Security-based background checks.204 TNCs argue
that “third-party background checks are safe and reliable.”205 After being
sued by two women who alleged they were assaulted by an Uber driver,
Uber described “its background checks as ‘industry leading’ or the ‘gold
standard.’”206
When it enacted H.B. 100, Texas also refused to mandate
fingerprint-based background checks.207 Not only did the legislature
201. MORAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 11.
202. See Aman Batheja, Uber, Lyft Shun Driver Fingerprint Requirements, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 7, 2015,
6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/10/07/background-checks-center-city-fights-uber/
[https://perma.cc/B687-W9UA] (quoting Austin City Councilwoman Ann Kitchen who stated that
Austin’s responsibility is to protect “Austinites and visitors,” which is why the city of Austin requires
fingerprint-based background checks for all ground transportation in Austin, including taxis, limos,
and bus drivers).
203. Id.
204. See MORAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 11 (“The public discourse about TNC background
checks has focused on the relative merits of two predominant types of checks routinely used to
screen an individual’s criminal background: a fingerprint-based background check . . . and a
name-based check, which is the preferred screening approach of some TNCs (notably Uber and
Lyft).”); see also Dug Begley, Lawmakers Proceeding with Texas-Wide Rules for Ride-Hailing Companies,
HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 20, 2017, 8:51 AM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/
transportation/article/Lawmakers-proceeding-with-Texas-wide-rules-for-11084623.php
[https://
perma.cc/3F5S-XLKN] (“The companies vigorously oppose fingerprint background checks,
favoring their background checks based on Social Security numbers.”). Not one state regulating
TNCs has instituted a fingerprint-based background check. MORAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 11.
205. MORAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 11–12.
206. Bhuiyan, supra note 160. Due to a claim of misrepresentation, Uber has since ceased
referring to their background check with such language. Id.
207. Act of May 29, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., H.B. 100, § 1 (codified at TEX. OCC. CODE ANN.
§ 2402.107(a)(2)). Rather than requiring fingerprint-based background checks, the legislature enacted
the following requirements:
Before permitting an individual to log in as a driver on the company’s digital network, a
transportation network company must . . . (2) conduct, or cause to be conducted, a local, state,
and national criminal background check for the individual that includes the use of: (A) a
commercial multistate and multijurisdictional criminal records locator or other similar
nationwide database; and (B) the national sex offender public website maintained by the United
States Department of Justice or a successor agency[.]

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss4/5

38

Salas: Holding Ridesharing Companies Accountable in Texas

2018]

COMMENT

917

disregard various cities who had implemented a strict background check
requirement to protect their residents from assaults by drivers,208 but they
also disregarded Texas residents who voted for such protections.209 The
legislature defended its position by noting that TNCs “use accredited
multi-state commercial background checks and screen against the national
sex offender registry. Additionally, security features built into TNCs,
including GPS tracking, driver photos, and standards based on rider
reviews, provide acceptable rider safety.”210
By mandating that TNC drivers undergo fingerprint-based background
checks, there is a higher probability of ensuring the safety of consumers in
Texas.211 And, although the legislature argued that there are security
features built into TNCs, by the time the safety features are used, the
potentially dangerous driver may have already passed a background check.
It would be safer for consumers, in this author’s opinion, to filter
potentially dangerous drivers via a rigorous background check, rather than
tracking down the driver once he or she has already been allowed to use
the TNC’s system. Moreover, even when claiming that fingerprint-based
background checks are burdensome and ineffective, TNCs have continued
operating in cities like Houston where fingerprint-based background
checks were required prior to the enactment of H.B. 100.212 It is also true
Id.
208. See MORAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 25 fig.4 (showing cities where TNCs suspended
service after the passage of regulations the TNCs did not support, including cities that passed
fingerprint-based background checks).
209. See, e.g., Nolan Hicks & Ben Wear, Prop. 1 Goes Down As Activist Proclaims:
‘Austin Made Uber an Example’, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN (May 8, 2016, 12:18 AM),
http://www.statesman.com/news/local-govt—politics/prop-goes-down-activist-proclaims-austinmade-uber-example/E0P3Ba6O2ZkW9QrHmc7xvI/ [https://perma.cc/4JAN-CE3T] (“Austin
voters on Saturday decisively rejected Uber and Lyft’s $8.6 million bid to overturn the city’s rules for
ride-hailing apps, bringing a stunning conclusion to the most expensive campaign in city history. . . .
The results keep in place the ordinance that the City Council approved in December, which requires
drivers with ride-hailing apps to undergo fingerprint-based background checks by Feb. 1, 2017.”).
210. House Comm. on Transp., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 100, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (emphasis
added).
211. See Audrey McGlinchy, Groups Say Fingerprint-Based Background Checks Could Lead to Racial
Discrimination, KUT (Oct. 19, 2015), http://kut.org/post/groups-say-fingerprint-based-backgroundchecks-could-lead-racial-discrimination [https://perma.cc/KFC4-X2XJ] (reporting on allegations
that fingerprint-based background checks help eliminate false or duplicate names and provide more
accuracy).
212. See Batheja, supra note 202 (“Houston is one of Uber’s only markets in which its drivers
have to undergo fingerprinting. . . . Though Uber is still available there, the company isn’t exactly
thrilled with Houston’s policy.”).
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that not all TNCs ceased operating in cities that enacted laws requiring
fingerprint background checks, evidencing the feasibility of such a
requirement.213 It is clear that the burden of requiring any type of
background check is outweighed by the need to protect the public’s
safety.214
B. Driver Training Programs
The Texas legislature also failed to institute a mandatory driver training
program.215 Other states have instituted such programs in order “to
address public safety concerns[,]”216 including California,217 Nebraska,218
and Washington, D.C.219 The program established in California by the
TNC Lyft educates drivers on: “Driver/passenger safety and support.
Drivers learn tips for ensuring safe trips, how to contact support, etc.”220
Drivers are also paired with a mentor who conducts a “safety ride-along
that covers a driver’s ability to obey traffic laws; reactions behind the
wheel when dealing with other drivers, bicyclists, pedestrians, etc.; and the
ability to focus on the road while holding a conversation.”221 Moreover,
Lyft’s program provides further training via webinars, by tracking driver

213. See Dave Byknish, Remaining Austin Ride-Sharing Companies All in Compliance with Code,
KXAN (Jan. 24, 2017, 6:21 AM), http://kxan.com/2017/01/24/remaining-austin-ride-sharingcompanies-all-in-compliance-with-code/ [https://perma.cc/Z27Z-R33G] (noting the TNCs Fare,
Fasten, GetMe, InstaRyde, RideAustin, Tride, Wingz, and zTrip were, in 2017, almost completely
complying with the Austin ordinance requiring fingerprint-based background checks).
214. When the city of Austin required that TNCs run a fingerprint-based background check,
the TNCs that continued operating had 8,343 drivers complete background checks. Id. Such
background checks resulted in 197 applicants being rejected, in effect removing potential danger and
protecting consumers. Id.
215. See generally TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2402.107 (West Supp. 2017) (detailing the
requirements individuals must fulfill before they are permitted to drive for a TNC but failing to
require participation in a mandatory driver training program).
216. MORAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 45.
217. See id. (“CPUC requires that all licensed TNCs operating in California report on their
driver training programs to ‘ensure all drivers are safely operating their vehicle prior to being able to
offer service.’”).
218. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 75-325 (West 2018) (“Every transportation network
company shall: . . . (h) Establish a driver training program designed to ensure that each driver safely
operates his or her personal vehicle prior to the driver being able to offer services on the
transportation network company’s online-enabled application or platform[.]”).
219. See MORAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 45 (“California, Nebraska, and Washington, D.C.,
require TNCs to establish some form of driver training program.”).
220. Id.
221. Id.
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performance, and—among other options—through coaching.222
Additionally, prior to the enactment of H.B. 100, Dallas, Houston, San
Antonio, and Austin all required that TNCs establish a driver training
program.223 TNCs who operated in these cities before H.B. 100 found a
way to balance public safety with the alleged burden of establishing a
driver training program.224
Instituting driver training programs will require more on the part of
TNCs; however, such programs will ensure drivers are qualified and
educated to drive under conditions they would not normally drive in.
VI. CONCLUSION
TNCs have created a loophole in the transportation industry, which
allows them to operate and produce considerable profits while avoiding
liability for costs incurred by other transportation companies. More
specifically, TNCs are able to deny liability for their drivers’ tortious acts
and still significantly profit from the services their drivers provide.
However, while TNCs should be held accountable for the safety of
consumers and third parties, they should not be held liable where they
have failed to violate any laws or where the law provides no protection. It
is not the judicial but rather the legislative branch that has failed Texas
residents by refusing to enact policy that is focused on public safety rather
than empowering large companies. While the insurance requirement and
the state-wide regulation under H.B. 100 are an enormous step forward in
regulating and holding TNCs accountable, despite H.B. 100’s
TNC-friendly provisions, the legislature must do more to ensure public
safety—a duty that falls within the scope of the legislature’s power. Thus,
it is of upmost importance that concerns regarding the regulation of TNCs
and the public safety of Texans are voiced to the legislature in the form of
requests for more stringent regulations, including the two proposals set
forth in this Comment.

222. Id. at 45–46.
223. GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 123, at 17 tbl.4.
224. See Byknish, supra note 213 (noting TNCs that remained in Austin are complying with the
city ordinance after it required more stringent background checks and driver training programs).
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